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There is longstanding tension in the study of religion between those who believe religion 
can be reduced to general psychosocial processes and those who think that religion is 
somehow unique. One way to test these two possibilities is to compare religious versions 
of mechanisms to nonreligious versions. If religion is somehow unique, then the religious 
versions should explain variance in outcomes that the nonreligious versions do not. Three 
studies confirmed religion‟s independent predictive power. Exposure to a religious 
supernatural agent reduced cheating more than exposure to a nonreligious supernatural 
agent (Study 1), receiving religious social support during a stressful task reduced 
cardiovascular reactivity (CVR) more than receiving nonreligious social support (Study 
2), and exposure to a religious meaning system increased charitable donations more than 
exposure to a nonreligious meaning system (Study 3). Further, individual differences in 
beliefs moderated these and other effects, indicating that religion warrants attention at 
multiple levels. These studies offer the first experimental evidence that religion cannot be 
fully understood through general psychosocial processes. The psychological study of 
religion has the potential to make unique contributions to our understanding of human 
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Is religion “just” supernatural agency, social support, or meaning? 
Religion is associated with an expanse of psychological, social, and health 
outcomes including social attitudes (Allport & Ross, 1967; Johnson, Rowatt, & Labouff, 
2010), emotional states (Emmons, 2005; Fredrickson, 2002), cognitive processing 
(Andresen, 2000; McIntosh, Silver, & Wortman, 1993), self-regulation (McCullough & 
Willoughby, 2009), prosocial behaviors (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Randolph-Seng & 
Nielsen, 2007), coping strategies (Newton & McIntosh, 2009a; Pargament, 1997), and 
physical and mental health (Koenig, 2008; Koenig & Larson, 2001; Koenig, 
McCullough, & Larson, 2001; McIntosh, Poulin, Silver, & Holman, 2011). Studies 
utilizing longitudinal, prospective, quasi-experimental, and experimental designs have 
begun to confirm causal effects of religion on various outcomes (Hood & Belzen, 2005). 
In short, religion does stuff. Further, because a majority of people nationwide (81.1%) 
and worldwide (67.3%) consider themselves religious (World Values Survey, 1981-
2004), religion has the potential to do stuff for the multitude. This scope is furthered by 
the personal salience religion tends to have for adherents; effect sizes of religion on 
outcomes are routinely medium to large (see Paloutzian & Park, 2005). When religion 
does stuff, it usually does it big. Given such substantive explanatory power, a question 
naturally arises – how does religion do what it does? 
Understanding the mechanisms by which religion influences outcomes is of 




mechanisms necessitate thick descriptive volumes of their operationalizations (e.g., Hill 
& Hood, 1999; recently, Hill & Pargament, 2008). By means of full or partial mediation, 
these mechanisms demonstrably account for relationships between religion and some 
outcomes. As will be detailed later, included among the confirmed mediators of religion 
are general processes in psychology that are not necessarily religious, such as social 
support, meaning-making, and others, leading some to argue that the mediators of 
relationships between religion and outcomes are “mundane” (Joiner, Perez, & Walker, 
2002, p. 214). By mundane, Joiner and colleagues mean that religious versions of these 
mediators should have the same effects as nonreligious versions. If this claim is accurate, 
it would imply that further study of religion is not necessary because we can understand 
religion by understanding general psychosocial processes. In the following pages, I hope 
to demonstrate that this conclusion is not (yet) warranted, but rather, whether religion is 
mundane is an untested empirical question. Additionally, I describe a series of studies 
designed to test this question by comparing religious versions of general psychosocial 
mechanisms to nonreligious versions. For example, is religious social support distinct 
from nonreligious social support? If religious versions of mechanisms exhibit 
independent predictive power of outcomes compared to nonreligious versions, this would 
be strong evidence that the mechanisms of religion are not merely mundane. 
If evidence points to the independent predictive power of religion, two possible 
explanations seem likely. First, there may be some property or properties of religion not 
captured by general psychosocial processes – perhaps a distinctive “religion factor” that 




a unique aspect of religion without a nonreligious analogue (e.g., the quality of 
transcendence or the sacred, belief in an afterlife, prayer, belief in an omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnipresent deity). The second way religion may explain independent 
variance is, as the Latin origin of the word suggests (religāre, “to tie together,” Latin 
Concise Dictionary, 1
st
 ed., 2003), religion may bind together various general processes 
in distinctive combinations. The independent predictive power of religion would then 
emerge from additive or interactive effects.    
Why are questions about the independent predictive power of religion important? 
There is longstanding tension in the study of religion between those who believe religion 
can be reduced to general psychosocial processes (i.e., mundane mediators) and those 
who think that religion is not fully reducible. This issue is at the heart of this paper. 
“‟Isn‟t religion just a bunch of hormones?‟...Is not religion merely a defense against 
anxiety?...Is not religion basically a way to find meaning in life?...Is not religion 
fundamentally a way to build social solidarity?” (Pargament, 2002, p. 240). The 
motivation behind these questions and the conclusion that the mediators of religion are 
mundane seems to be the reduction of religion into a neat package of basic processes that, 
per se, have little to do with religion. Put another way, to understand the effects of 
religion on outcomes, we need only to understand the general, non-religious mechanisms 
that theoretically mediate the effects of religion. There is no reason to think that religious 
versions of those mechanisms should have any different effects on outcomes than 
nonreligious versions. Some find this approach and its implications objectionable because 




loses an important level of analysis (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005). The alternative is 
that the study of religion adds explanatory power to the study of psychology, explaining 
outcomes beyond general psychosocial processes.  
Results of the studies proposed here will speak directly to this controversy. If 
religious processes do not offer independent explanatory power of outcomes beyond that 
of general processes, psychologists should focus on the more parsimonious reductionist 
alternative – why bother to study religion? However, if religious processes do have 
independent predictive power, adding something psychologically or socially influential, 
then resources should be directed towards the study of religion in its own right.  
Defining religion 
 To begin an analysis of the mechanisms of religion, it is helpful (but difficult) to 
define what is meant by religion. This task is difficult because definitions of religion 
almost unfailingly commit one of two errors – inclusion or exclusion. Definitions with 
inclusion errors tend to be overly broad. For example, some definitions classify anything 
with a meaning-making function as religion (Barrett, 2001; Lindbeck, 1984), perhaps 
including systems of belief that adherents would adamantly deny are religious at all, such 
as atheism and secular humanism. Definitions with exclusion errors tend to be specific to 
a fault. For example, some definitions of religion identify belief in a supernatural creator 
god as integral, ruling out non-theistic faiths that do not meet this criterion, such as 
Buddhism (James, 1916; Nelkin, 2000). Theologians, sociologists, lawyers, 
neuroscientists, historians, philosophers, anthropologists, and psychologists may all 




have their own biases. As one scholar of religion observed, “any definition of religion is 
likely to be satisfactory only to its author” (Yinger, 1967, p. 18). 
Further muddying the waters, it is possible to draw sharp divides between related 
concepts including religion and spirituality, personal and institutional religion, ethnic and 
elective religion, and a host of others (see Paloutzian & Park, 2005 and Hood, Hill, & 
Spilka, 2009). These distinctions have been and continue to be useful tools for 
conceptualizing a complex phenomenon. Clearly, religion is multidimensional – not just 
one thing, but an organization of things. However, there is a real danger of succumbing to 
an overwhelming proliferation of distinctions in the definition of religion, some of which 
may be semantic, not actual, with significance that is theoretical, not practical. Other 
distinctions may be redundant.  
One explanation for these pitfalls of defining religion is that religion is a fuzzy 
concept (Zinnbauer et al., 1997). That is, due to its inherent fuzziness, the content of 
religion varies by condition, from situation to situation and individual to individual. Thus 
the boundary conditions of religion are difficult to grasp. A successful operationalization 
of religion is therefore likely to depend on that which is clearly in the religious domain, 
rather than marginal conceptions. This is not to suggest that these marginal conceptions 
are unimportant, or are not about religion, but rather those aspects of religion that are 
most central to ideas about religion provide the best basis for empirical study. To 
determine these central aspects of religion, one only need look to the culture. Ideas of 
religion that are the most widely held and the most frequently transmitted from one 




religion. These central aspects of religion are also the most likely to be part of a cognitive 
schema of religion (McIntosh, 1995). 
Religion-as-schema 
A schema is a mental structure that represents an understanding of a particular 
domain, including information about how various parts of that structure are related. 
Precedence of mental activation in a schema is given to attributes of a schema that are the 
most central and salient (Neisser, 1967). For example, concepts like “used for sitting” and 
“has four legs” will be more active in a chair schema than less central concepts like 
“smashed in professional wrestling” and “can have wheels.” Theoretically, a religious 
schema is no different, bringing a useful benefit to the table of defining religion. The 
schematic structure of a religion brings to the fore aspects of religion that are most central 
and salient, those that are most easily accessible. Some of these easily accessible features 
of religion, important for defining, understanding, and studying religion, will be 
identified and addressed later. 
Conceptualizing religion-as-schema has advantages beyond defining religion, 
extending to both theory and method. I will first consider the applications of religion-as-
schema on theory. Schemata are constructed from experience (Neisser, 1976). Therefore, 
those who have similar experiences (e.g., are raised in the same culture) will likely have 
similar schemata. Religion is often deeply personal, but it is also a pervasive group-level, 
cultural phenomenon (Cohen & Hill, 2007). Most residents of the United States share the 
experience of constant exposure to religion. Religious people, buildings, and symbols are 




pass the same religious billboards on the highway and the same religious radio stations on 
the dial. One need not be a religious believer to know that the white-haired bearded guy 
(probably wearing sandals and sitting in a cloud) in the film or comic strip is God. 
Therefore, perhaps it is not necessary for an individual to be personally religious to have 
a religious schema. This inference is widely supported by recent experimental research 
demonstrating that certain effects of religion are not limited to the religious (Newton & 
McIntosh, 2009b; Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007; 
Ritter & Preston, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). 
Another characteristic of schemata with implications for conceptualizing religion-
as-schema is that specific features of a schema can be embedded in general features 
(Neisser, 1976). Applied to religion, specific features of a religious schema (e.g., belief 
that God is benevolent) can be embedded in more general features of religion (e.g., 
religion is linked to meaning; McIntosh, 1995). It may be that the more general features 
of religion are culturally transmitted and are therefore widely held as part of the cultural 
level religious schema. Both atheists and theists would share this cultural level of 
religious schema. However, based on previous research indicating the centrality of 
individual differences in religion, we know the specific, personal level of religious 
schemata is also important. Further, we know that specific religious beliefs can moderate 
more general effects of religion (Newton & McIntosh, 2009a; Newton & McIntosh, 
2010). Consistent with these results, considering religion-as-schema allows for both 




A final theoretical benefit of a religion-as-schema conceptualization is that it can 
accommodate different accounts of why religious versions of mechanisms may explain 
variance that nonreligious versions do not. As described above, there are two possible 
explanations of religion‟s potential independent predictive power. A distinctive “religion 
factor” may add something transformative to a general mechanism or religion may bind 
together general processes not typically related outside the rubric of religion. Indeed, a 
religion-as-schema conceptualization already implies this latter possibility. Under the 
umbrella of religion-as-schema, these two accounts are not mutually exclusive. It is 
possible that a schema of religion may contain unique aspects of religion as well as bind 
together more general psychosocial processes. 
Considering religion-as-schema also has an important methodological 
ramification. Namely, schemata can be primed (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Chen, 
& Burrows, 1996). Priming occurs when exposure to a stimulus makes certain content or 
procedures temporarily more available, or salient, than they would otherwise be. This 
availability is then recruited in response to a later stimulus, resulting in an effect of the 
earlier stimulus on the later stimulus, often without the conscious awareness and control 
of the participant. Priming has been a useful methodology in psychology, illuminating the 
organization of semantic networks, directional relationships between stimuli, and the 
active content of schemata (Bargh, 2006; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Recently priming 
has been used successfully in the study of religion, with the priming of religion leading to 
a wide range of outcomes including less self-attribution for actions with ambiguous 




& McIntosh, 2009b, Pichon et al., 2007; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007), prejudiced attitudes (Johnson et al., 2010), mood states and life 
satisfaction (Wiegand & Weiss, 2006), and physiological responding (Weisbuch-
Remington, Mendes, Seery, & Blascovich, 2005). With few exceptions, these studies 
primed religion at a general, abstract level, usually using iconic religious images or 
religious words (e.g. God, sacred, prophet, divine). 
Although priming religion at this general level has provided insight into outcomes 
affected by religion, it is nonetheless charged with interpretive difficulties. As a colleague 
asked, “what in God‟s name are we priming?” The short answer is that we are priming 
concepts that are part of or related to religion – the religious schema (McIntosh, 1995). 
But what constitutes that schema? When religion is primed in general, as in the studies 
mentioned above, it is impossible to know exactly which aspects of religion are 
responsible for which outcomes. For example, when prosocial behavior is increased 
following a general prime of religion, we do not know if the effect was due to thoughts of 
a supernatural agent who would want and reward prosocial behavior, a sense of 
belonging to a group that engages in prosocial behavior, or perhaps activation of a 
meaning system consistent with prosocial behavior. Of course, all these aspects of 
religion may combine to lead to increases in virtuous behavior, but even this possibility 
remains underspecified when religion is primed in general. The answer to this problem 
may be how religion is primed. By contextualizing the religion prime in certain domains 
or as specific mechanisms of religion (e.g., a religious supernatural agent), it may be 




religion. In particular, specific primes enable identification of outcomes which are 
conceptually proximal or distal to the particular manipulation of religion. Conceptually 
proximal outcomes should be most directly affected by the manipulation, but spreading 
activation through the religious schema should also affect more conceptually distal 
outcomes, although effects may weaken as outcomes become increasingly conceptually 
distal (see Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Further, this type of contextualized, specific 
priming allows for a tightly controlled comparison of religious versions of mechanisms to 
nonreligious versions.  
Selecting mechanisms for comparison  
Researchers in the psychology of religion have come a long way toward 
explaining relationships between religion and psychological, social, and health outcomes, 
identifying a multitude of potential mechanisms. Although we may eventually wish to 
test all these for independent predictive power, it is best to begin with the most promising 
candidates, the mechanisms that provide the strongest test of differences between 
religious and nonreligious versions. Three considerations will narrow the field – the type 
of mechanism, the type of associated outcomes, and how central the mechanism is to 
religion. 
As discussed previously, one way to determine whether religion is reducible to 
more basic processes is to compare religious versions of those processes to nonreligious 
versions, testing whether religion adds any explanatory power for outcomes. This method 
requires identifying the mechanisms of religion that have nonreligious analogues. 




an afterlife, prayer, or belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent deity, are not 
well-suited to this technique. However, aspects of religion that do have nonreligious 
analogues are well-suited, including supernatural agency (i.e., God vs. ghost), social 
support (i.e., religious v. nonreligious social support), and meaning (i.e., religious vs. 
nonreligious meaning). 
Another consideration for identifying the most promising candidate mechanisms 
to test the predictive power of religion is the kind of outcomes they explain. As 
summarized above, religion has been linked to a wide expanse of general psychological, 
social, and health outcomes including social attitudes, emotional states, cognitive 
processing, self-regulation, prosocial behaviors, coping strategies, and physical and 
mental health. However, in addition to these general outcomes, religion has also been 
linked to religious outcomes, such as religious conversion (Paloutzian, 2005), spiritual 
wellbeing (Ando, Morita, Okamoto, & Ninosaka, 2008), attachment to God (Kirkpatrick, 
2005), appraisals that God is in control (Newton & McIntosh, 2009a), and feelings of 
closeness to one‟s religious community (Meisenhelder & Marcum, 2004). Although a 
deeper understanding of the interrelations of the mechanisms of religion and religious 
outcomes has led psychologists of religion to a critically deeper understanding of religion 
itself, the approach is somewhat insular. The relationship between religious variables and 
religious outcomes does not fully illuminate the relationship of religion with more 
general processes and outcomes. Therefore, the mechanisms that provide the best test of 
the independent predictive power of religion are those that explain variance in general, 




shown to have effects on cheating behavior (Bering, McLeod, & Shackelford, 2005; 
Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007). Social support has effects on cardiovascular reactivity 
(CVR) and wellbeing (Chen & Contrada, 2008; Gallagher & Vella-Brodrick, 2008; 
O‟Donovan & Hughes, 2008). Finally, meaning has an effect on sense of coherence in 
life (Baumeister, 1991; Kark, Carmel, Sinnreich, Goldberger, & Friedlander, 1996; 
Pohlmann, Gruss, & Joraschky, 2006). 
Finally, we must also consider how central the mechanism is to religion. This 
consideration is closely tied to the definition of religion and to the content of the religious 
schema. As noted above, religion is highly variable and is therefore difficult to peg, 
especially the fuzzier boundary conditions of religion. Therefore, to best test the 
independent predictive power of religion, the mechanisms most central to religion should 
be considered. The centrality of the mechanisms of religion can be identified by how 
persistent they are in the culture. For example, in Western culture, a supernatural agent is 
consistently part of religion (Guthrie, 1993). Likewise, the communal aspect of religion 
and the social support it entails is a central part of religion in the culture (Durkheim, 
1995). Finally, the provision of meaning is perhaps the most characteristic aspect of 
religion in the culture (Baumeister, 1991). 
Thus, we arrive at three criteria for selecting mechanisms of religion to test 
religion‟s independent predictive power – having nonreligious analogues, with predictive 
power for general outcomes, and central to cultural concepts of religion. I have selected 
three mechanisms of religion that meet these three criteria – supernatural agency, social 




three criteria, but they are a good place to start because they have garnered particular 
attention in the literature. Each of these has been proposed as an explanation for how 
religion does what it does. However, a question crucial to understanding religion remains 
outstanding. Are these mechanisms distinct in their religious forms compared to 
nonreligious forms? 
Supernatural agency 
How does religion do what it does? Part of the answer may be that it provides a 
supernatural agent (Boyer, 2001; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Supernatural agents may 
be either religious (e.g., God) or nonreligious (e.g., ghosts). Recent experimental studies 
have induced thoughts about nonreligious supernatural agents and measured the effects of 
this induction on various outcomes. In one study participants who were casually told that 
the ghost of a dead graduate student had been recently seen in the testing room cheated 
less on a task (Bering et al., 2005). In another study from the same lab, children who 
were told that Princess Alice, who is invisible, is watching them were less likely to open 
a box that was previously forbidden to them (Bering, 2006). Experimental manipulation 
of a religious supernatural agent – priming God – has resulted in similar outcomes 
including less cheating (Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007) and more generosity (Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007, Pichon et al., 2007; Preston, Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010). These 
findings have led to a supernatural monitoring hypothesis; thinking about a supernatural 
agent makes people feel their actions are being watched (Gervais & Norenzayan, under 
review; McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2011). Bering and Johnson (2005) 




possessing traits that make cheating inadvisable, such as not being deceivable, caring 
about moral actions, and meting out punishment for wrong doing. Norenzayan and 
Shariff (2008) also advocate for a supernatural monitoring explanation, but emphasize 
reputational concerns over characteristics of the supernatural agent. In support of a 
watcher effect operating through reputational concerns, simple pictures of eyes, even 
stylized eyespots, increase prosocial and decrease antisocial behavior (Bateson, Nettle, & 
Roberts, 2006; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009). Clearly, feeling watched 
makes people behave better. However, it should be noted that although Gervais and 
Norenzayan (in press), Bering and Johnson (2005), and Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) 
lump religious and nonreligious supernatural agents into the same category with the same 
theoretical explanation, the effects of these two different kinds of supernatural agents 
have never been directly compared. 
In what ways might a religious supernatural agent (i.e., God) be different from a 
nonreligious supernatural agent (i.e., Ghost)? The supernatural monitoring hypothesis 
posits that there is not necessarily a difference between the effects of a religious and a 
nonreligious supernatural agent. This approach is reminiscent of basic social psychology: 
the presence or imagined presence of others changes the way people think, feel, and act 
(Allport, 1985). However, just as we know that not all “others” have the same effects on 
thoughts, feelings, and actions (see Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010), not all supernatural 
“others” should have the same effects. Indeed, ideas about God are often very different 
than ideas about ghosts. In Western culture, God is an agent who can possess both 




omnipotence, omnipresence) qualities and who rewards morality and punishes 
immorality. Ghosts are much more limited, both in scope and in strength of the cultural 
concept. Ghosts simply are not as culturally prevalent as God, and what is culturally 
present about ghosts is scattered. For example, do they care about our morality (e.g., 
Dickens‟ Ghost of Christmas Past) or not (e.g., Slimer from Ghostbusters)? Are they nice 
(e.g., Casper the friendly ghost) or mean (e.g., Bloody Mary)? In support of the limited 
effects of ghosts, the studies described above which examined the effects of nonreligious 
supernatural agents (i.e., Princess Alice and the graduate student ghost) took pains to 
contextualize the agent to the physical location of the participant. This limitation suggests 
that simply exposing participants to a “ghost” stimulus may not have much effect on 
prosocial behavior. Therefore, there is good reason to think the supernatural monitoring 
hypothesis is an incomplete explanation of the effects of supernatural agents on prosocial 
outcomes. Although feelings of being watched by a supernatural agent may be 
experienced and have subsequent effects on outcomes, the effects of God and ghost on 
prosocial outcomes should differ. 
A religion-as-schema conceptualization allows for this possibility in two ways. 
First, different characteristics of religious and nonreligious supernatural agents described 
in the previous paragraph are imbued by the culture and are therefore part of cultural 
schema. The religious schema contains a supernatural agent especially well-suited to 
encouraging prosociality. Second, religion-as-schema suggests a strong automatic 
association between religion and prosociality, fostered by cultural transmission (see 




in the cultural idea of religion, that it has become integral to the religious schema. Indeed, 
the stereotype of religious individuals as especially prosocial strongly affects response 
strategies in economic games (de Dreu, Yzerbet, & Leyens, 1995). According to religion-
as-schema, when exposed to religious stimuli (e.g., a religious supernatural agent), people 
access related concepts (e.g., prosocial thoughts and actions). This response seems to be 
at least somewhat automatic or ideomotor; even studies that subliminally prime religion 
find prosocial effects including less cheating (Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007), more 
prosocial intentions (Pichon et al., 2007, Study 1), more group cooperation (Ritter & 
Preston, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Perhaps even more compelling evidence of 
a schematic automatic association is that religious stimuli have effects on prosocial 
outcomes even on those who are not religious (Pichon et al., 2007; Randolph-Seng & 
Nielsen, 2007; Ritter & Preston, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, Study 1), a finding 
difficult to explain under the supernatural monitoring hypothesis. Why think that God is 
watching you if you don‟t believe in God? 
Religion-as-schema offers an alternative to the supernatural monitoring 
hypothesis, but more than that, it can explain many effects of religion, not just effects of a 
religious supernatural agent on conceptually proximal outcomes. Cheating behavior is 
conceptually proximal to religious supernatural agency because the idea of God as a 
watchful and moral agent is very strong in the culture. However, according to religion-as-
schema, exposure to a religious supernatural agent should also affect conceptually distal 
outcomes through spreading activation, including sense of coherence in life, prosocial 




is more than supernatural agency. As mentioned above, another central aspect of religion 
is the social support if offers. 
Social support 
How does religion do what it does? Part of the answer may be that it offers 
opportunities for social support (George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002). Social support is a 
ubiquitous mechanism linked to many positive outcomes including less depression 
(Zuroff & Blatt, 2002), more effective coping with stressors (Peacock & Wong, 1990), 
and greater subjective wellbeing (Gallagher & Vella-Brodrick, 2008). In its religious 
incarnation, social support is often operationalized as religious attendance or 
participation. As such, religious social support has been linked to the same positive 
outcomes as social support in general, including less depression (Idler & Kasl, 1992), 
more effective coping with stressors (see Pargament, 1997), and greater subjective 
wellbeing (Ellison & George, 1994; Greenfield & Marks, 2007; Koenig & Larson, 2001; 
Idler, McLaughlin, & Kasl, 2009). Of particular interest to health scientists is the link 
between social support and mortality. Both general social support (House, Landis, & 
Umberson, 1988; Williams et al., 1992) and religious social support (Oman & Reed, 
1998; McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, & Thoresen, 2000; Strawbridge, Shema, 
Cohen, & Kaplan, 2001) are strong predictors of longer life.  
One proposed mechanism of the link between social support and mortality is 
lower cardiovascular reactivity (CVR) in the face of stress. For example, given the 
stressful task of giving a speech before evaluators, the presence of a supportive individual 




reducing CVR to a more adaptive profile (Chen & Contrada, 2007; Lepore, Allen, & 
Evans, 1993; O‟Donovan & Hughes, 2008; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). 
Further, characteristics of the supporter have been shown to moderate the effects of social 
support. For example, if the confederate is somehow similar to the participant, the social 
support offered by that confederate has better effects on cardiovascular outcomes 
(Hilmert, Kulik, & Christenfeld, 2002; O‟Donovan & Hughes, 2008). Although similarity 
can take a number of influential forms (e.g., race, gender), less tangible similarities (e.g., 
attitudes, group membership) have also been identified as effective moderators of social 
support in acutely stressful situations (O‟Donovan & Hughes, 2008; Stroebe & Diehl, 
1988; Wellman & Wortley, 1990). Similarity effects on social support have also been 
confirmed beyond experimental settings. Individuals with homogenous social networks 
perceive those networks to offer more support in the face of stress and thereby experience 
greater wellbeing (Robicheaux, 2003). 
In what ways may religious social support be different from nonreligious social 
support? Fiala, Bjorck, and Gorsuch (2002) suggest two possibilities. First, support from 
co-religionists may be perceived as support from God. Numerous studies have examined 
the role of support from God in coping with stress and have found largely positive effects 
(see Pargament, 1997). The second way religious social support may differ from general 
social support is that it refers to social support only from persons within one‟s faith 
tradition, those who share similar goals and values relative to ultimate matters (e.g., one‟s 
religious leaders and fellow adherents). Further, because many faith traditions encourage 




co-religionist may have even more of an effect on outcomes. Note that both of these 
possibilities take into account the similarity of the supporter. The effects of social support 
from a co-religionist should be different than effects of social support from those with a 
different religious identification. Therefore, the effect of religious social support on 
outcomes should be moderated by similarity. 
A religion-as-schema conceptualization offers another reason why religious social 
support may be distinctive. Religion may have an automatic association with social 
support and its salutatory effects such that simple exposure to religious stimuli may 
increase the efficaciousness of social support. That is, experiences linking religion and 
social support are so culturally prevalent, that religion may have automatic effects on 
outcomes associated with social support. While moderation by similarity may seem 
contrary to the automatic effects suggested by a religion-as-schema approach, the effects 
of similarity may also be automatic (see Bargh, 1989). 
Differences between religious and general social support, as well as the 
importance of the similarity of religious social support, were bolstered in a study of 
American Protestants that found religious social support, including support from fellow 
congregants, to be associated with positive outcomes like greater life satisfaction, even 
when controlling for general social support (Fiala et al., 2002). These results were 
replicated in a similar study examining religious social support in Jews (Lazar & Bjorck, 
2008). Among Jews living in religious settlements, religious social support, particularly 
support from the religious community, explained variance in cognitive and health 




seems religious social support positively affects health and wellbeing outcomes not 
simply because it is social support, but because it is also religious. Further, it seems that 
not just any religious social support will have these beneficial effects; support from those 
who are religiously similar seems especially effective. 
As discussed earlier, a religion-as-schema conceptualization integrates many 
aspects of religion into one cognitive structure and is therefore capable of explaining 
effects of religious social support on many outcomes, not just conceptually proximal 
outcomes like health and wellbeing. Through spreading activation in the religious 
schema, religious social support should also have an effect on conceptually distal 
outcomes (e.g., cheating behavior, prosociality, and sense of coherence in life). 
Moreover, religion-as-schema submits that religion is more than social support. The 
provision of meaning is another central aspect of religion. 
Meaning 
How does religion do what it does? Part of the answer may be that it provides 
meaning in life (Park, 2005a; Park, 2005b). Why are we here? What is life all about? 
What happens when we die? Answers to these and other existential questions are 
identified as central to finding meaning in life (see Baumeister, 1991, and Adams, 1979). 
This meaning can either be general (Baumeister, 1991; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Koltko-
Rivera, 2004) or religious (Batson & Stocks, 2004; McIntosh, 1995; Park, 2005a); both 
types are associated with positive outcomes including a greater sense of coherence in life 




While both general meaning and religious meaning have effects on similar 
outcomes, the relationship between religion and meaning is especially strong. In fact, 
religion is often defined by its relationship to meaningfulness (Batson & Stocks, 2004; 
Pargament, 1997; Park 2005a), and the provision of meaning has been identified as a key 
function of religion (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003; Frankl, 1977; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; 
Schweiker, 1969). The relationship between religion and meaning may even explain the 
persistent link between religion and wellbeing (George et al., 2002; Park, 2007; Stenger 
& Frazier, 2005). Indeed, religion has been identified as particularly adept at providing 
meaning in life to its adherents, especially when meaning is threatened. For example, 
positive religious coping was a strong predictor of finding meaning in the violent death of 
a child (Murphy, Johnson, & Lohan, 2003). Similarly, religious participation and rating 
religion as important were related to finding meaning in the sudden death of a child, and 
through finding meaning, more wellbeing and less distress later in time (McIntosh et al., 
1993). Experimental results are consistent with these findings. When primed with 
meaninglessness or thoughts of death, participants reported greater religiousness, 
suggesting that religious meaning compensates for deficits in general meaning 
(Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Van Tongeren & Green, 2010). The reverse is also true; 
when made to think about religion, religious participants found reminders of death and 
meaninglessness less threatening (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). 
In support of the uniqueness of religious meaning, one study found that religious 
appraisals (e.g., attributing a death to God) were significant predictors of finding meaning 




attributing a death to a doctor; Mickley, Pargament, Brant, & Hipp, 1998). Another study 
found that religious coping, a kind of religious meaning-making (e.g., “I tried to find the 
lesson from God in the event”), had effects on outcomes of kidney patients that were not 
mediated by nonreligious meaning mechanisms (e.g., general cognitive structuring; Tix 
& Frazier, 1998).  
While both these studies hint that religious meaning is distinct from nonreligious 
meaning, a more direct comparison is desirable. Pohlmann and colleagues (2006) 
compared individuals who presumably had either a religious or a secular source of 
meaning, and found that theology students had more differentiated, elaborated, and 
coherent personal meaning systems than science students. Similarly, a comparison of 
religious and secular kibbutzim in Israel found that religious kibbutz members had a 
higher sense of coherence in life than their secular counterparts (Kark et al., 1996). 
Although these two studies directly compared groups that presumably derived meaning 
from either a religious or a nonreligious source, interpretation of these results is limited 
because the groups were naturally occurring. Individuals with different levels of meaning 
may have self-selected into different groups, or other group differences might have 
existed besides the source of their meaning systems. Ideally, a randomized experiment 
could be used to answer the question of whether religious meaning is distinct from 
nonreligious meaning. 
One way to manipulate and compare religious and nonreligious meaning is to 
concretize meaning into a meaning system, that is, a conglomerate of beliefs and values 




systems may also be thought of as worldviews, fundamental assumptions, or philosophies 
of life (cf. Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Jung, 1942/1954; Koltko-Rivera, 2004). One such 
meaning system is humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is characterized by benevolence 
toward all humans and is associated with many prosocial outcomes, including supporting 
public aid for the poor (Shen & Edwards, 2005) and donations to charity (Fong, 2007). In 
the form of humanitarianism, meaning can take on religious and nonreligious versions 
(i.e., religious and secular humanitarianism; see Day, 1952, and Russell, 1925, 
respectively) which can be manipulated and compared. If religious meaning is distinct 
from nonreligious meaning, religious humanitarianism should explain variance in 
outcomes such as charitable giving and sense of coherence beyond that explained by 
nonreligious humanitarianism. 
Why might religious meaning be different from nonreligious meaning? Religious 
meaning may be unique because it derives from and pertains to that which is divine, 
numinous, and transcendent, making claims about an ultimate reality relevant to all of 
human experience. As such, religion has the ability to “interpret each life or each event in 
a context that runs from the beginning of time to future eternity” (Baumeister, 1991, p. 
205). Indeed, the broad interpretive scope of religion has led some to identify religion 
itself as an especially effective meaning system (Park, 2005b; Schweiker, 1969; 
Silberman, 2005). Religious meaning may thereby have enhanced effects on meaning-
related outcomes due to its vast interpretative power.  
Religion-as-schema provides another explanation for different effects of religious 




culture, an automatic association between the two seems likely, as well as an automatic 
association between religion and outcomes related to meaning, such as sense of 
coherence in life. Further, as described above, prior research points to an automatic 
association between religion in general and prosociality (see Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008 
and Preston et al., 2010). This association may drive the effects of religious 
humanitarianism on prosocial outcomes, such as charitable giving. Conceptualizing 
religion as a cognitive schema implies automatic effects of religious humanitarianism on 
conceptually proximal outcomes, including sense of coherence and charitable giving. 
Because religious meaning draws upon a broader schema of religion, it should also 
predict conceptually distal outcomes, including cheating behavior and subjective 
wellbeing, by way of spreading activation. 
Testing religion for independent predictive power 
Funder (2002) argues, “the active ingredients of religion…are shared with many 
other possible sources…it may be a better strategy to focus on the ingredients rather than 
on one particular source, even religion” (p. 213). Is he right? Or, as I predict, do religious 
versions of active ingredients explain variance in outcomes that nonreligious versions do 
not? To begin this inquiry, I have selected three mechanisms that meet optimal criteria 
for testing whether religion is distinct: supernatural agency, social support, and meaning. 
Past research has tested the independent predictive power of religion in three ways – 
partialing variance explained by religious and nonreligious mechanisms, comparing 
religious and nonreligious versions of mechanisms within individuals, and comparing 




The partialing approach for testing the independent predictive power of religion 
entails the use of partial correlation to statistically isolate the explanatory variance of 
religion. This approach has largely been implemented with cross-sectional correlational 
data. For example, Ciarrocchi and Deneke (2004) concluded that there is something more 
to religion when they found that religiousness made a small but significant contribution 
in predicting subjective wellbeing over and above the contributions of demographic 
variables and the five factors of personality. Other studies confirm Ciarrochi and 
Deneke‟s finding with religion explaining one to five percent of variance above other 
variables such as personality across a number of different outcomes (Golden, 2002; 
Piedmont, 2001). However, this approach to testing the independent predictive power of 
religion has several limitations. First, it is not very surprising that religion explains 
variance above and beyond variables such as the five factors of personality. In fact the 
lack of redundancy between religion and the five factors of personality is so pronounced 
that it has been suggested that spirituality and religiousness dimensions together form a 
sixth personality factor (Piedmont, 2001). The second limitation of the partialing 
approach is the difficulty of controlling for every possibly relevant variable. Should 
marital status of parents be controlled? Socioeconomic status? Level of social support? 
The third limitation of the partialing approach is that it is a much less direct test of 
religion‟s independent predictive power than is comparing a religious version of a 
mechanism to a nonreligious version. 
Emmons, Chueng, and Therani (1998) took the second, more direct approach of 




“spiritual strivings” – a kind of religious motivation – to other kinds of nonreligious 
strivings within individuals. They found that the correlation between spiritual strivings 
and wellbeing was stronger than the correlations between other, nonreligious strivings 
and wellbeing. Religious motivation seems to explain more variance in wellbeing than 
other motivations. This finding is similar to that of Mickley and colleagues (1998) 
discussed above; religious appraisals were better predictors of finding meaning in life 
than nonreligious appraisals. 
Two studies utilizing the third way that past research has tested the independent 
predictive power of religion (i.e., comparing groups relying on either religious or 
nonreligious versions of mechanisms) have already been described. Theology students 
with a religious source of meaning had more differentiated, elaborated, and coherent 
meaning systems than science students with a secular source of meaning (Pohlmann et 
al., 2006) and religious kibbutz members had a higher sense of coherence in life than 
their secular kibbutz members (Kark et al., 1996). However, as noted above, without 
random assignment to condition, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the religious 
mechanism from individual difference confounds and without manipulation, it is difficult 
to determine the causal relationships between mechanisms and outcomes. Experimental 
designs can address these limitations as well as lend convergent validity to the already 
suggestive results of other studies that religion has independent predictive power.  
The lack of experimental designs testing the contributions of religion is 
understandable. Participants would probably not take random assignment to religion well. 




religion have shed light on the causal contributions of religion in general and have made 
it possible to determine the whether the effects of specific mechanisms of religion are 
unique. 
Present studies 
If the effects of religion are more than mundane mediation, then the effects of 
religious and nonreligious versions of mechanisms on conceptually proximal outcomes 
should differ. Specifically, priming a religious supernatural agent should result in less 
time spent cheating than priming a nonreligious supernatural agent. Receiving religious 
social support in a stressful task should result in lower CVR and greater subjective 
wellbeing than receiving nonreligious social support. Finally, priming a religious 
meaning system should result in larger donations to charity and a greater sense of 
coherence in life than priming a nonreligious meaning system. 
I also predict that religious and nonreligious versions of mechanisms should 
differentially affect outcomes that are seemingly unrelated to the manipulation, those that 
are conceptually distal. This should be the case if a religious schema is broader than a 
nonreligious schema thereby recruiting more domains into a unitary cognitive construct 
of religion. Specifically, priming a religious supernatural agent should result in greater 
sense of coherence, more prosociality intentions, and greater subjective wellbeing than 
priming a nonreligious supernatural agent; receiving religious social support should result 
in greater sense of coherence, larger donations to charity, and less time spent cheating 
than receiving nonreligious social support; and priming a religious meaning system will 




nonreligious meaning system. However, it should be noted that effects on conceptually 
distal outcomes may be less powerful than effects on conceptually proximal outcomes 
(see Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). 
Finally, as suggested by a religion-as-schema conceptualization, individual 
differences in belief should moderate the predicted main effects on both conceptually 
proximal and distal outcomes. Specifically, I predicted that the effect of the religion 
manipulation should be greater for more religious individuals. For Study 1, I also 
predicted that the nonreligious manipulation (i.e., Ghost priming), would have a greater 








 Before the laboratory session of all studies, participants (N = 216) completed an 
online questionnaire. Participants completed the questionnaire about one week before the 
lab session (Study 1: M = 7.58 days, Median = 6; Study 2: M = 7.68 days, Median = 7; 
Study 3: M = 9.36 days, Median = 6), though time between the online questionnaire and 
the lab session ranged from 1 day to nearly 6 months in one case (Study 3). The 
questionnaire assessed demographic variables, individual differences in religion, 
supernatural beliefs, sense of coherence in life, satisfaction with life, emotional states, 
and social desirability. Zero-order correlations between these measures can be found in 
Table 1. 
Individual differences in religion 
 Four individual differences in religiousness were measured: degree of 
religiousness, intrinsic religiousness, God image, and religious verticality. Degree of 
religiousness was measured with a single item, “How religious or spiritual do you 
consider yourself to be?” on a scale of 1 (not at all religious or spiritual) – 10 (extremely 
religious or spiritual). 
Intrinsic religiousness is a committed approach to religion for its own sake, 
differing from extrinsic religiousness, which refers to religious behavior motivated by 
instrumental concerns, such as individual and social benefit to the self. This construct 




from the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). Respondents ranked 
agreement with positively and negatively valenced statements on a scale from (5) 
strongly agree to (1) strongly disagree. Items on the I-scale include “I enjoy reading 
about spirituality and/or religion” and “Although I am religious and/or spiritual, I don‟t 
let it affect my daily life” (reverse coded). This scale is widely used and has good 
psychometric properties (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). Consistent with other work, the 
reliability alpha was .79, here.  
 God image, the way that people think about God, was assessed by a 36-item 
measure comprising the most reliable items from Lawrence‟s (1997) initial psychometric 
testing of the God Image Inventory (GII). To make the scale more universally applicable, 
I replaced all instances of the word “God” with “God, the sacred, or a higher power” (see 
Newton & McIntosh, 2009). Responses range from strongly agree to strongly disagree, 
or not applicable. Items include “God, the sacred, or a higher power asks me to keep 
growing as a person" and “God, the sacred, or a higher power is looking for a chance to 
get even with me” (reverse coded). We combined items to create an index of overall 
positivity in God image (α = .94). The higher a person scored on the GII, the more 
positive that person‟s image of God.  
 Vertical and horizontal dimensions of religion refer to spiritual, deity-focused and 
humanistic, person-focused aspects of religion, respectively (Benson, Donahue, & 
Erickson, 1993; see also prayer types described by Ladd & Spilka, 2002). Adherents can 
focus on either or both of these dimensions. The relative strength of these foci was 




horizontally or a vertically focused response to complete a sentence stem (Newton & 
McIntosh, 2009). For example, “When I donate money to a church, religious or spiritual 
organization, or charity, I do it more to…” This stem can be completed with either “give 
back generously to God, the sacred, or a higher power” (i.e., the vertical response) or 
“help those less fortunate” (i.e., the horizontal response). Alternatively, participants could 
indicate that neither option is reflective of their beliefs, or that the item is not applicable 
to them. Scores were summed across items by scale (items marked “Neither is true for 
me” were excluded), and totals of the scales for each participant were transformed to a 
ratio of how vertically focused a person is relative to how horizontally focused that 
person is. For example, someone who scored a 4 on the vertical scale and a 2 on the 
horizontal scale would have the same verticality ratio as someone who scored a 6 and a 3, 
respectively. Because ratio data are bounded by zero and are therefore naturally 
positively skewed, a base-10 logarithmic transformation was used to improve normality 
(see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 As seen in Table 1, intercorrelations among degree of religiousness, intrinsic 
religiousness, and God image were very high (r‟s = .65, .70, .73). Correlations between 
these three measures of religiousness and verticality were also high but consistently lower 
(r‟s = .51, .57, .59), suggesting that the verticality measure may be accessing a related, 
but distinct dimension of religion. Principal component analyses of these variables also 
bore out this distinction. All four religion variables yielded one factor explaining 72% of 
the variance. However, verticality had the lowest factor loading (.77). Principle 




of the variance. Degree of religiousness, intrinsic religiousness, and God image had 
factor loadings higher than .88. Internal consistency of these three religion measures 
without verticality included was acceptable (α = .67), so degree of religiousness, intrinsic 
religiousness, and God image scales were z-scored and combined into a religion 
composite. Verticality, given its weaker relationship with the other three religion 
measures, was kept as a distinct measure. 
Paranormal belief 
 Paranormal belief was assessed with the 26-item Revised Paranormal Belief Scale 
(Tobacyk, 2004). Seven scales measure different kinds of paranormal belief: Traditional 
Religious Belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, Extraordinary Life Forms, 
and Precognition. Items include "It is possible to communicate with the dead" 
(Spiritualism) and "Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future" 
(Precognition). The measure is psychometrically sound (Tobacyk, 2004). In the current 
study, although reliability for each of the seven subscales were acceptable (α = .59 - .89), 
reliability for the overall measure very high (α = .91). Therefore, I collapsed the subscales 
into one measure used in subsequent analyses. 
Sense of coherence in life 
 Sense of coherence in life was measured with Antonovsky‟s (1987) Sense of 
Coherence Scale. This 29 question scale assesses  
“…the extent to which one has a pervasive, enduring, though dynamic feeling of 
confidence that (1) the stimuli deriving from one‟s internal and external 
environments in the course of living are structured, predictable, and explicable; 
(2) the resources are available to one to meet the demands posed by these stimuli; 
and (3) these demands are challenges, worthy of investment and engagement” 




It typically has high reliability (α = .82 - .95; Antonovsky, 1993), replicated here (α = 
.89).  
Satisfaction with life 
Satisfaction with life was measured by the five-item Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), a measure of subjective wellbeing. 
The SWLS uses a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), has well 
documented validity (Diener et al., 1985), and the typically high reliability of the measure 
(α‟s ≥ .80; Pavot & Diener, 1993) was also found in this study (α = .87). 
Emotional states 
 Emotional states were assessed with a 10-item International Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule - Short Form (I-PANAS-SF; Thompson, 2007). Participants rated 
agreement on a 1-5 scale with five items (alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active) 
measuring positive affect (α = .78) and five items (upset, hostile, ashamed, nervous, 
afraid) measuring negative affect (α = .74). 
Social desirability 
A short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960; Ballard, 1992) was used to assess trait social desirability. The scale 
includes 13 true/false items with socially desirable though improbable responses such as 
"I‟m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake" and "I sometimes feel resentful 
when I don‟t get my way" (reverse coded). In the current study, reliability was acceptable 







Study 1. Supernatural Watcher Mechanism 
 I hypothesized that subliminal exposure to a religious supernatural agent would 
reduce time spent cheating more than subliminal exposure to a nonreligious supernatural 
agent and a control condition. I further predicted that subliminal exposure to a religious 
supernatural agent would affect more conceptually distal outcomes, including more 
prosocial intention, greater sense of coherence in life, and greater satisfaction with life 
compared to subliminal exposure to a nonreligious supernatural agent. Finally, I 
predicted that individual differences in religion and paranormal belief would moderate 
these effects. 
Method 
Participants. In exchange for course credit, 88 undergraduates completed an 
online questionnaire and a series of laboratory tasks. Eight participants (9.1%) were not 
native English speakers and were not included in further analyses, leaving a final sample 
of 80 (78.8% female; 87.5% white; Age: 17-28, M = 19.94). Participants were religiously 
diverse
1
; 35% self-identified as nonreligious. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to complete a lexical decision task (LDT) 
aimed at subliminally priming supernatural agents, either religious (i.e., God; N = 24) or 
nonreligious (i.e., Ghost; N = 28). Subliminal presentation of the neutral word "Glue" (N 
= 28) served as the control condition. Participants were instructed to judge as quickly as 




using a keyboard response. Each of the 20 trials of the LDT contained a 250ms premask 
(i.e., XXXXXX), a 15ms exposure to a subliminal prime (i.e., either the word “God”, 
“Ghost”, or “Glue”, depending on randomly assigned condition), a 50ms postmask (i.e., 
XXXXXX), and finally, presentation of the target letter string for 500ms (see Figure 1). 
The letter strings were words for 10 of the trials and nonword anagrams of those words 
for the other 10 trials (Pichon et al., 2007). These 10 words were affectively neutral and 
unrelated to religion. Using a funnel debriefing procedure suggested by Bargh and 
Chartrand (2000) to probe for experimental awareness of subliminal manipulation, I 
found that supernatural agency priming occurred outside of conscious awareness for all 
participants but one. This participant was eliminated from subsequent analyses.  
 Following the priming LDT, time spent cheating was assessed with a mental 
rotation task ostensibly designed to measure spatial intelligence (adapted from Bering et 
al., 2005; see Figure 2 for a sample question). Individuals were assured that their answers 
would remain anonymous and confidential (to reduce concerns about social detection), 
but were also told that they were competing for a $25 grand prize to increase competitive 
motivation. Prior to the administration of the computerized spatial intelligence test, the 
experimenter read these instructions, also presented on the computer screen, aloud: 
“In a moment, you will begin the test on the computer. There are 25 multiple 
choice items on the test. For each problem, you will be shown a “target” figure 
(an image) and asked to mentally rotate that image in your head. You will then be 
asked to select from a group of figures that matches the target object. For 
example, you might be shown a square and asked how the square would look if it 
were folded a certain way. You will be given 2 practice questions and will have 





The experimenter also read aloud the following: 
“IMPORTANT NOTE: Because this is a new test, the computer program 
periodically malfunctions. In some instances, the correct answer may appear on 
the screen BEFORE the actual problem. If you see the word “ANSWER” at any 
time, this is a mistake (this is the correct answer to the following problem). If this 
happens, please press the space bar immediately so that you can solve the 
problem honestly. ONLY BY PRESSING THE SPACE BAR WILL THE 
SCREEN BE CLEARED. Thank you for your patience while we attempt to fix 
this problem.” 
 
Thus, the latency of response to press the space bar on these “glitch” items was 
within the participants control and served as an unobtrusive measure of cheating behavior 
in a competitive task when the risk of social detection was ostensibly low to absent. Later 
tests of this measure of cheating in Studies 2 and 3 found a relationship between time 
spent cheating and performance on this difficult test; the longer participants waited before 
pressing the spacebar, the greater the number of correct responses (r(62) = .36, p = .004; 
r(65) = .31, p = .01). Computer problems troubled data collection for two participants; 
these were not included in analyses of the task. Although the computer "glitch" was 
mentioned as odd for 18 of the participants during debriefing, none realized it was a 
measure of cheating so none of these were dropped from analysis. 
Following the cheating measure, prosocial intentions were assessed with a task 
designed by Pichon and colleagues (2007) and slightly altered to more plausibly fit the 
current research context. A table with 20 copies of pamphlets from the University of 
Denver Center for Civic Engagement and Service Learning (CCESL) was set up in a 
hallway outside of the lab room. This program encourages students to actively engage 
with the community and to find ways both in and outside the classroom to accomplish 




participant from one room to another, s/he gave the participant the opportunity to take as 
many prosocially oriented pamphlets as s/he wishes by saying:  
“I don‟t know if you‟ve heard, but the psychology department is supporting 
student involvement in community service. We‟d like to take advantage of your 
presence here to remind you the importance of community engagement and the 
service learning program. If you wish, you can take as many flyers as you like 
and distribute them to others to contribute to the greater awareness of the 
humanitarian objectives of CCESL."  
 
To avoid self-presentation bias, the experimenter then feigned forgetting a form in the lab 
room, and left the participant alone at the pamphlet table to retrieve it. Following the lab 
session, missing pamphlets, taken by the participant, were counted. 
After participants had the opportunity to take the prosocial flyers, they completed 
a questionnaire, including the Sense of Coherence scale (Antonovsky, 1987), Satisfaction 
with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985), and the I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007). These 
scales were used to compute change scores from the prequestionnaire to the lab session. 
Psychometric characteristics of these measures from the prequestionnaire, the lab session, 
and the resulting change scores for Studies 1, 2, and 3 can be found in Table 2. 
 Next, participants completed the Religious Word Completion Task (Raad, 2003) 
as a manipulation check. Participants were instructed to complete 36 word fragments 
(e.g., C L O _ _, F L _ W _ R) of which nine could be completed with either a religious 
or a nonreligious word (e.g., C _U _ C H can be either CHURCH or CLUTCH). Number 





 Finally, participants were led through a funnel debriefing interview designed to 
ascertain suspicion of the manipulation and measures and to fulfill the ethical obligation 
of veracity. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. The Religious Word Completion Task (Raad, 2003) 
assessed whether the experimental manipulation had an effect on participants. Four 
participants who were not able to complete two or more of the critical words from the 
task were eliminated from analyses. Further, three bivariate outliers in the control 
condition were also eliminated from analyses. An ANOVA trend suggested that condition 
did have an effect on religious word completion (Figure 3), F(2, 70) = 2.34, p = .104. 
Tukey post-hoc comparisons suggested that this trend was driven by more religiously 
completed words by those in the God condition (M = 2.0, SE = .22) compared to those in 
the Glue control condition (M = 1.36, SE = .21), p = .097. This difference indicates a 
successful manipulation of religion. The difference between the God and Ghost (M = 1.8, 
SE = .21) and Ghost and Glue conditions were not significant, p's= .79, .31. 
 Emotional states were assessed in both the prequestionnaire and the lab session to 
determine if the effects of priming were due to emotional processes. Positive and 
negative emotional states during the lab session were not affected by priming (p's = .36, 
.26), nor were changes in positive and negative emotional states from the 
prequestionnaire to the lab session (p's = .24, .78), indicating that other priming effects 




 As seen in Table 3, social desirability was marginally related to the number of 
prosocial flyers taken by participants in the study, r(79) = .20, p = .07. Further, although 
not significant, social desirability also showed a small relationship with change in 
satisfaction with life. To ensure that effects described below were not due to social 
desirability, all analyses controlled for social desirability using ANCOVAs and stepwise 
regressions. Sometimes including social desirability in the model slightly increased effect 
sizes, sometimes slightly decreased effect sizes. However, controlling for social 
desirability did not substantially change the direction or size of any significant effects. 
Therefore, the reported analyses do not adjust for social desirability. 
 Main effects. I hypothesized that subliminal exposure to a religious supernatural 
agent would reduce time spent cheating more than subliminal exposure to a nonreligious 
supernatural agent or a control condition. An ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
priming condition on time spent cheating in the mental rotation task (Figure 4), F(2, 75) 
= 3.34, p = .041. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three groups revealed those 
subliminally primed with the word "God" (M = 9566, SE = 1573) cheated less than those 
subliminally presented with the word "Glue" (M = 15143, SE = 1483), p = .012. 
Comparisons between those subliminally primed with the word "Ghost" (M = 12852, SE 
= 1483) and the other two groups were not statistically significant at p < .05.  
I also hypothesized that subliminal exposure to a religious supernatural agent 
would result in more prosocial flyers taken, greater sense of coherence in life, and greater 




control condition. Using ANOVA, I found no evidence of these predicted main effects 
(overall p's = .83, .60, .67).  
 Interaction effects. I predicted the individual differences in beliefs would 
moderate effects of condition on time spent cheating, number of prosocial flyers taken, 
sense of coherence in life, and satisfaction with life. Specifically, I expected that God 
priming condition would have greater effects on outcomes in the context of higher 
religiousness and greater vertical orientation in religion. I also expected the Ghost 
priming condition to have greater effects on outcomes in the context of higher 
paranormal belief. Zero-order correlations of outcome and moderator variables can be 
found in Table 4. Relationships of predictors with outcome variables were examined 
using a series of multiple regression analyses with condition as a 3-level categorical 
predictor and religiousness, verticality, and paranormal belief as centered continuous 
moderators. Condition was dummy coded into two variables (Condition: God and 
Condition: Ghost) with the control level (Glue) as the reference group. Interaction terms 
were computed by multiplying each of the continuous moderators by the each of the 
dummy codes. Five terms were entered into each regression testing the interaction of 
experimental condition and belief variable: the two dummy coded variables of the 
condition (Condition: God and Condition: Ghost), the continuous moderator, the product 
of Condition: God and the continuous moderator, and the product of Condition: Ghost 
and the continuous moderator. Results of regression analyses testing religious beliefs as a 
moderator can be found in Table 5 and those testing paranormal belief as moderators can 




 There was a trend Condition: Ghost X paranormal belief interaction predicting 
time spent cheating, B = -3975, p = .054. In the control condition (Glue), as paranormal 
beliefs increased, so did cheating. However, this increase in cheating was eliminated 
under the ghost prime condition; those with higher paranormal beliefs no longer showed 
increased cheating if they were first primed with Ghost. The interaction of paranormal 
belief with the God prime was not significant (p = .23). See Figure 5.  
 The effect of condition on number of prosocial flyers taken was moderated both 
by verticality and by paranormal belief (Figures 6 and 7). A trend indicated that those 
high on verticality in the God condition took more prosocial flyers than those high on 
verticality in the control condition, B = 2.92, p = .081. Further, a significant interaction 
indicated that those high on verticality in the God condition took more prosocial flyers 
than those high on verticality in the Ghost condition, B = 3.595, p = .042. Paranormal 
belief also helped to explain the effect of condition on number of prosocial flyers taken. 
A significant interaction indicated those in the God condition high on paranormal belief 
took fewer prosocial flyers compared to those high on paranormal belief in the control 
condition, B = -.491, p = .051. The interaction of paranormal belief with those in the 
Ghost condition was not significant, p = .23. 
 The effect of condition on change in satisfaction with life from the 
prequestionnaire to the lab session was moderated by a marginal Condition: Ghost X 
verticality interaction, B = -2.236, p = .055. Compared to the control condition, 
participants exposed to the Ghost prime experienced a greater increase in satisfaction 




Moreover, religiousness also moderated effects of condition on change in satisfaction 
with life (Figure 9). Specifically, a trend suggested that those high in religiousness in the 
God condition experienced a greater increase in satisfaction with life than those high in 
religiousness in the Ghost condition, B = .38, p = .097. 
 Adding the interactions between condition and verticality to the model predicting 
change in sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session resulted in a 
significant increase in variance explained, R
2
Change = .166, F(2, 73) = 7.35, p = .001. This 
increase was driven by a significant Condition: God X verticality interaction, B = -1.919, 
p = .002. Participants high in verticality in religion experienced a decrease in sense of 
coherence in life when primed with God compared to the control condition. Further, this 
interaction also holds comparing those in the God condition to those in the Ghost 
condition, B = -2.281, p < .001. See Figure 10.  
Discussion 
These results indicate that religious supernatural agency is distinct from 
nonreligious supernatural agency. Compared to the control condition, priming God 
resulted in less cheating whereas priming Ghost did not, offering evidence against a 
generalized supernatural monitoring hypothesis (see Gervais & Norenzayan, under 
review); the type of supernatural agent matters.  
I also predicted supernatural agent priming would have differential effects on 
more conceptually distal outcomes, supporting the theory that religion functions as a 
cognitive schema tying together many aspects of religion (McIntosh, 1995). However, 




number of prosocial flyers taken, change in sense of coherence in life, or change in 
satisfaction with life. There are several possible reasons for the failure to find these 
effects. Perhaps conceptualizing religion-as-schema is not accurate; tapping one aspect of 
religion does not generalize to other aspects of religion as expected with spreading 
activation in a religion schema. Another possibility stems from the design of the study. 
Number of prosocial flyers taken, change in sense of coherence in life, and change in 
satisfaction with life were not only conceptually distal to supernatural priming, but were 
also temporally distal. Therefore, a lack of effects on these distal outcomes could also be 
because the effects of the prime decayed over time (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). While 
time spent cheating was measured immediately following the supernatural agent priming, 
other outcomes were measured as long as 40 minutes after the prime. Or, perhaps priming 
God did not adequately activate the religion schema for a significant main effect, but 
taking individual differences in belief into account would help to reveal effects of 
supernatural agent priming on these more distal outcomes. Indeed, results of the 
moderation analyses suggest the later explanation is correct. 
The number of prosocial flyers taken was not directly affected by priming 
condition, but taking individual differences in verticality into account clarified the effect 
of the God prime. Those in the God priming condition took more prosocial flyers, but 
only when they were also more vertically oriented in their religiousness. That is, 
participants who focus more on God in religion than on other people and were exposed to 
a subliminal God prime responded to that prime as predicted. Therefore, because the 




moderated effect, a religion-as-schema conceptualization is supported. Further, at least by 
the time participants had the opportunity to take the prosocial flyers, the priming effects 
were not yet decayed. Indeed, because condition differences existed between the God 
prime and the control conditions during the final task, the word completion manipulation 
check, it is reasonable to assume the priming effects persisted to some degree throughout 
the experimental session. 
Individual differences in paranormal belief also moderated the effect of 
supernatural priming condition on number of prosocial flyers taken. Although I predicted 
paranormal belief would moderate the effect of the Ghost condition, it instead moderated 
the effect of the God condition with those higher on paranormal belief in the God prime 
condition taking fewer prosocial flyers compared to the control condition. Therefore, 
higher religious belief (i.e., verticality) resulted in more prosocial flyers taken in the God 
condition while higher paranormal belief resulted in fewer prosocial flyers taken in the 
God condition. The God prime had the predicted effect, but only in the context of a 
religious belief. In the context of paranormal belief, the opposite effect was present. 
The effect of condition on time spent cheating, the only outcome directly affected 
by supernatural priming condition, was also moderated by paranormal belief. As 
predicted, for participants high on paranormal belief, those in the Ghost priming 
condition spent less time cheating compared to those in the control condition. A match 
between condition and individual difference in belief (e.g., Ghost condition and 




 Change in satisfaction with life contrariwise showed a mismatch of condition and 
individual difference; verticality moderated the effect of the Ghost prime. Those high on 
verticality experienced a decrease in change in satisfaction with life from the 
prequestionnaire to the lab session in the Ghost condition compared to those in the 
control condition. Again, an individual difference in religion, verticality, had the opposite 
of the predicted effect on the outcome when moderating the Ghost condition. However, 
in a match of condition and individual difference, participants who scored high on the 
religion composite in the God condition experienced an increase in satisfaction with life 
compared to the Ghost condition. Taken together with the findings of the previous 
paragraphs, these results suggest that predicted moderation effects emerge only in 
specific circumstances – when individual differences in belief match the priming 
condition. That is, paranormal belief enhances the effect of the Ghost priming and 
religious belief enhances the effect of the God priming. Mismatches between type of 
prime and individual difference resulted in the opposite of predicted effects of condition. 
This specificity of the effects of religion will be again taken up in the general discussion. 
 Finally, priming condition and individual difference in belief matched for the 
change in sense of coherence outcome, but the found effect was opposite of the predicted 
effect. Those high on verticality in the God prime condition experienced a decrease in 
sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the end of the lab session. This may be 
because the sense of coherence is arguably the most conceptually distal outcome. Sense 




may have altered the effect of the manipulation. For example, receiving a God prime and 







Study 2. Social Support Mechanism 
 I hypothesized that those receiving support from a religiously similar confederate 
in a stressful situation would experience less CVR and more satisfaction with life than 
those receiving support from a politically similar or dissimilar confederate. Further, I 
predicted effects on more conceptually distal outcomes. Specifically, that those receiving 
support from a religiously similar confederate would experience a greater sense of 
coherence in life, be more prosocial, and cheat less than those receiving support from a 
politically similar or dissimilar confederate. Finally, I predicted that individual 
differences in religion would moderate these effects. 
Method 
 Participants. In exchange for 20 dollars, 80 undergraduates completed an online 
questionnaire and a series of laboratory tasks. Five participants (6.3%) were not native 
English speakers and were not included in further analyses. Manipulated condition for six 
participants (7.5%) was lost or not correctly implemented due to experimenter error; 
these were also eliminated from further analysis. Therefore, useable data were available 
for 69 participants (79.7% female; 85.5% white; Age: 18-53, M = 22.71). Participants 
were religiously diverse
2
; 30.4% were nonreligious. 
 Physiological measures. During the experimental session, physiological channels 
were sampled continuously at 1000 Hz using BioPac hardware and Acqknowledge 4.0 




Wilhelm & Peyk, 2005) was used to exclude artifacts in the data and to compute the 
mean for heart rate and mean arterial blood pressure (MAP) during the baseline period, 
speech preparation, speech delivery, and recovery period.
3
 Heart rate was calculated from 
the R-R intervals in the electrocardiogram. Following the recommendation of Cacioppo, 
Tassinary, and Berntson (2007), all analyses of heart rate control for somatic movement. 
Systolic (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) were obtained from a pressure-
sensitive cuff on the wrist of the non-dominant hand. These were used to compute MAP 
(mmHg; 2DBP/3 + SBP/3).
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Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were greeted by an 
experimenter who introduced a female confederate as a fellow participant. The 
experimenter then apologized for a "computer error" resulting in the loss of some data 
from the online questionnaire about the participants. The experimenter then asked first 
the confederate and then the participant to answer those lost questions. Depending on 
condition, the experiment asked about either degree of religiousness and religious 
affiliation or degree of political mindedness and political affiliation. Using the 
participant's responses to the online questionnaire, the confederate, depending on 
condition, responded to the religion or political questions either similarly to the 
participant‟s online responses or dissimilarly. Similar responses included the same 
affiliation and a similar degree. For example in the religiously similar condition, if a 
participant was Baptist and a 7 on a scale of 1-10 of religiousness, the confederate 
claimed to be Baptist and an 8 on a scale of religiousness. The confederate in the similar 




responded with a 10 on the scale, in which case, the confederate responded 1 degree 
lower than the confederate. Dissimilar responses included a different affiliation and 
dissimilar degree. For example, if a participant was Republican and a 3 on a scale of 1-10 
of political mindedness, the confederate claimed to be Democrat and a 10 on a scale of 
political mindedness. Thus, the confederate was portrayed as religiously similar (N = 18), 
religiously dissimilar (N = 16), politically similar (N = 18), or politically dissimilar (N = 
17) to the participant.  
Following this manipulation, a rigged coin toss determined that the participant 
would "go first" in the procedure and the confederate would watch. The confederate was 
asked to leave to complete some cognitive tasks as the participant was seated and 
physiological sensors attached. The participant then watched a 2 minute neutral film clip 
to establish a physiological baseline.  
Following the neutral film clip, the confederate returned to the room with the 
participant. The participant was then given 2 minutes to prepare a 3 minute speech for a 
job interview on his or her communication skills. The speech was videotaped and 
participants were told that they would be later evaluated by a panel of trained judges. 
Most people find this type of task stressful (Egloff, Wilhelm, Neubauer, Mauss, & Gross, 
2002; Hilmert et al., 2002). The religiously or politically similar or dissimilar confederate 
offered emotional support to the participant as he or she prepared and delivered the 
speech. Emotional support was made salient by encouraging remarks, open body 
language, and friendly facial expressions (Suganuma & Ura, 2001). Although the 




there was a potential for bias. Two coders with a high degree of interrater reliability (α = 
.84) and blind to condition, later counted the number of socially supportive interactions 
between the confederate and the participant using an established coding scheme (Suhr, 
1990). Coders found no significant differences among the experimental groups, p = .67, 
suggesting that the confederate, although not blind to condition, did not bias results by 
offering more social support to participants in one group more than another. 
Following the speech task, prosociality was measured when participants were 
given the opportunity to donate money to a charity. Each participant was given a 
description of the charity, Action Against Hunger and were told 
“As you know, you will be paid $20 for your participation today. I will bring 
you your money in a moment, but please look over this description of Action 
Against Hunger, a charity our research lab believes in and supports. You will 
have the opportunity to donate all, some, or none of your payment today to 
Action Against Hunger. You are not required to donate anything if you do not 
wish. Your donation will be kept confidential.” 
 
Participants were then left alone to review information about the charity.
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After two 
minutes, the experimenter returned and paid the participant $20 in singles for his or her 
time and asked "Did you decide to make a donation today?" If so, the donation was 
accepted and recorded. 
 After choosing whether and how much to donate, participants completed a 
questionnaire which included the Sense of Coherence scale (Antonovsky, 1987) the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985), and the I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 
2007) followed by the Religious Word Completion Task (Raad, 2003). Finally, 




described as part of Study 1 followed by a funnel debriefing interview similar to that 
given in Study 1. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. To examine whether the speech task was physiologically 
stressful to the participants, I conducted two repeated measures MANOVAs with 
experimental stage as the repeated factor (baseline, speech preparation, and speech 
delivery) and heart rate and MAP each as dependent variables. Heart rate was 
significantly increased during speech preparation and speech delivery relative to the 
baseline, Wilks‟s λ = .30, F(2, 43) = 51.11, p < .001, as was MAP, Wilks‟s λ = .51, F(2, 
31) =15.09, p < .001 (see Figures 11 and 12). 
 Emotional states, assessed in both the prequestionnaire and the lab session, were 
examined to determine if the effects of the religiously or politically similar or dissimilar 
confederate were due to emotional processes. Confederate identification did not have an 
effect on positive and negative emotional states during the lab session (p's = .32, .20) or 
on change in positive or negative emotional state from the prequestionnaire to the lab 
session (p's = .12, .69). The absence of effects of condition on emotional states suggests 
that other effects of condition are not due to emotional processes. 
Given the significant relationship between social desirability and change in 
satisfaction with life, r(66) = .33, p = .007, the trend with MAP during speech 
preparation, r(46) = -26, p = .08, and other nonsignificant small effect sizes seen in Table 




stepwise regression. However, controlling for social desirability did not substantively 
change effects and so statistics reported here do not adjust for social desirability. 
 The religious word completion task, intended to be a manipulation check of the 
effect of confederate identification, was not affected by condition, p = .68. However, 
because the religion manipulation was accomplished through a social route (i.e., 
confederate identification) rather than a cognitive route as in Studies 1 and 3, a word 
completion task accessing cognitive activation of religion may not have been the most 
appropriate manipulation check. Therefore, the efficacy of the religion manipulation can 
be judged by found effects. 
 Main effects. I hypothesized that those receiving support from a religiously 
similar confederate in a stressful situation would experience less CVR during preparation 
and delivery of a stressful speech than those receiving support from a politically similar 
or dissimilar confederate. As participants prepared their speech, the identification of the 
confederate offering social support affected both heart rate and MAP. A 2 (Type of 
affiliation: religious, political) by 2 (Similarity of confederate: similar, dissimilar) 
ANOVA revealed a trend main effect of type of affiliation on heart rate during speech 
preparation (Figure 13), F(1, 44) = 3.798, p = .058. That is, participant heart rate was 
lower with social support from a religiously identified than a politically identified 
confederate during speech preparation. Contrast analyses indicated that this effect was 
driven by the difference between support from a religiously similar versus a politically 
similar confederate. Specifically, those receiving social support from a religiously similar 




support from a politically similar confederate (M = 91.57, SE = 2.55), F(1, 44) = 4.52, p 
= .039. MAP during speech preparation was also affected by confederate identification, 
although along the similarity dimension instead of type of affiliation. Participants 
receiving social support from a similar confederate, regardless of religious or political 
identification, experienced lower MAP (Figure 14), F(1, 42) = 7.95, p = .007. Contrast 
effects indicated that the effect of similarity was most prominent for religiously identified 
confederates. That is, those who received support from a religiously similar confederate 
had lower MAP (M = 90.92, SE = 2.77) than those who received support from a 
religiously dissimilar confederate (M = 102.41, SE = 3.58), F(1, 42) = 6.66, p = .013. 
 During speech delivery, heart rate and MAP were also affected by confederate 
characteristics (see Figures 15 and 16). A 2 (Type of affiliation: religious, political) by 2 
(Similarity of confederate: similar, dissimilar) ANOVA found a main effect of type of 
affiliation such that social support from a religiously identified confederate, regardless of 
the similarity of that identification, resulted in lower heart rate than social support from a 
politically identified confederate, F(1, 43) = 8.43, p = .006. Contrasts showed that this 
effect was driven more by participants in the similar condition, with those receiving 
support from a religiously similar confederate (M = 87.69, SE = 3.37) experiencing lower 
heart rate during speech delivery than those receiving social support from a politically 
similar confederate (M = 100.62, SE = 3.31), F(1, 43) = 7.42, p = .009. MAP during 
speech delivery was also affected by confederate characteristics; a significant interaction 
indicated that the effect of type of affiliation depended on the similarity of confederate. 




.64), but it did make a difference for religiously identified confederates (F(1, 30) = 13.09, 
p = .001). That is, social support from a religiously similar confederate resulted in lower 
MAP (M = 94.12, SE = 3.26) than social support from a religiously dissimilar confederate 
(M = 111.33, SE = 3.46). Further, a contrast analysis comparing effects of social support 
from religiously and politically similar confederates found a trend that those who 
received social support from a religiously similar confederate experienced lower MAP 
than those who received social support from a politically similar confederate (M = 
102.67, SE = 2.83), F(1, 30) = 3.93, p = .057. 
 I also hypothesized that those receiving support from a religiously similar 
confederate in a stressful situation would experience more satisfaction with life 
(operationalized as change in satisfaction with life from the online measure to the lab 
measure) than those receiving support from a politically similar or dissimilar confederate. 
A 2 (Type of affiliation: religious, political) by 2 (Similarity of confederate: similar, 
dissimilar) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction (Figure 17), F(1, 64) = 7.75, p = 
.007. Participant satisfaction with life increased more with social support from a 
religiously dissimilar confederate (M = .58, SE = .18) than a politically dissimilar 
confederate (M = .21, SE = .17), F(1, 64) = 6.79, p = .011. Conversely, a contrast 
comparing the effects of confederates identified as similar to the participant (whether 
religious or political) found that participant satisfaction with life increased more with 
social support from a politically similar confederate (M = .52, SE = .17) than a religiously 




 I predicted that those receiving support from a religiously similar confederate 
would experience a greater sense of coherence in life, give more to charity, and cheat less 
than those receiving support from a politically similar or dissimilar confederate. I found 
no evidence of a confederate effect on change in sense of coherence in life from the 
prequestionnaire to the lab session. However, a 2 (Type of affiliation: religious, political) 
by 2 (Similarity of confederate: similar, dissimilar) ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction effect on amount donated to charity (Figure 18), F(1, 65) = 4.06, p = .048. 
Participants receiving social support from a politically similar confederate (M = 6.61, SE 
= 1.01) gave almost $4 more to charity than those receiving social support from a 
religiously similar confederate (M = 3.11, SE = 1.01), t(22.94)= 2.03, p= .055.
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Participants receiving social support from a politically similar confederate gave over $5 
more to charity than those receiving social support from a politically dissimilar 
confederate (M = 1.47, SE = 1.04), F(1, 65) = 12.64, p = .001.  
A trend main effect of the confederate's type of affiliation was found on time 
spent cheating (Figure 19), F(1, 59) = 2.96, p = .091. Participants receiving social support 
from a religiously similar confederate (M = 7875, SE = 1908) cheated less than those 
receiving social support from a religiously dissimilar confederate (M = 12481, SE = 
1843), F(1, 59) = 3.02, p = .088. Further, participants receiving social support from a 
religiously similar confederate cheated less than those receiving social support from a 
politically similar confederate (M = 13190, SE = 1682), F(1, 59) = 4.37, p = .041. 
 Interaction effects. I predicted the individual differences in religion would 




time spent cheating, and sense of coherence in life. Specifically, I expected that higher 
religiousness and greater vertical orientation in religion would increase the effect of 
social support from a religiously identified confederate compared to a politically 
identified confederate (regardless of similar or dissimilar identification). Zero-order 
correlations of outcome and moderator variables can be found in Table 7. Relationships 
of predictors with outcome variables were examined with a series of multiple regression 
analyses with type of affiliation (religious = 1, political = 0) as a 2-level categorical 
predictor and religiousness and verticality as centered continuous moderators. The 
interaction term was computed by multiplying each of the continuous moderators by the 
categorical predictor. Three terms were entered into each regression testing the 
interaction of condition and religion variable: type of affiliation (religious or political), 
the continuous moderator, and the product of the type of affiliation and the continuous 
moderator. Results of all regression analyses can be found in Table 8. Each regression 
analysis was also run separately for participants in the similar condition and in the 
dissimilar condition. However, results for the two groups were akin to combined results, 
albeit weaker, so combined results are reported. 
 The effects of condition on time spent cheating, amount donated to charity, and 
change in sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session were all 
moderated by verticality. Specifically, a significant condition X verticality interaction, B 
= -26592, p = .003 indicated that participants high in verticality in religion cheated less 
after receiving social support from a religiously identified confederate compared to those 




 As shown in Figure 21, a trend indicated participants who were high on verticality 
and received social support from a religiously identified confederate donated more to 
charity than those who were high on verticality and received social support from a 
politically identified confederate, B = 11.314, p = .059. 
 Finally, a trend indicated that, compared to those who received social support 
from a politically identified confederate, participants who received social support from a 
religiously identified confederate and were high on vertical religiousness experienced a 
greater decrease in sense of coherence, B = -.768, p = .069. See Figure 22.  
Heart rate and MAP during speech preparation and delivery were not moderated 
by individual differences in religion, nor was change in satisfaction with life.  
Discussion 
These results indicate that social support from a religiously identified confederate, 
especially a confederate who identified as religiously similar, is distinct from social 
support from nonreligiously identified confederate. CVR (heart rate and MAP) during 
both speech preparation and delivery was lower for participants receiving social support 
from a religiously identified confederate versus a politically identified confederate, with 
those receiving support from a religiously similar confederate consistently presenting the 
best cardiovascular profile. That the effect of religious social support on CVR is 
moderated by the similarity of the confederate‟s religious identification to the 
participant‟s religious identification is consistent with others‟ findings that social support 
is more effective from ingroup members and people who have similar attitudes (see 




for religiously similar and religiously dissimilar social support suggested entirely 
different subjective experiences. Those who received religiously similar social support 
had relatively low heart rate and low blood pressure during speech preparation and 
delivery, a pattern linked with overall lower stress (Lepore et al., 1993; Mendes, 2009). 
On the other hand, those who received religiously dissimilar social support had relatively 
low heart rate and high blood pressure during speech preparation and delivery, a pattern 
linked with perceiving the stressful event as threatening (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & 
Salomon, 1999; Mendes, 2009). The importance of these findings is amplified by the link 
between cardiovascular response to stress and long term cardiovascular risk (Lovallo & 
Gerin, 2003). Indeed, the privileged role religious social support seems to play in CVR to 
stress could help to explain the robust correlation between religion and physical health 
(Koenig et al., 2001; McIntosh et al., 2011) and even lower mortality rates among 
religious adherents (McCullough et al., 2000). 
Characteristics of the supporting confederate also affected satisfaction with life, 
though not entirely as predicted. While participant satisfaction with life increased more 
with social support from a religiously identified confederate compared to a politically 
identified confederate as predicted, this was only true for confederates purporting to be 
dissimilar from the participant. For participants receiving support from a similar 
confederate the opposite pattern emerged; satisfaction with life decreased with religious 
identification compared to a political identification. This pattern may have emerged 
because the participants felt negatively aroused due to the stressful speech task, but did 




to them on a dimension thought to be related to satisfaction with life (i.e., religion) and 
who did not seem to be experiencing the same negative arousal (indeed, someone who 
seems quite comfortable and even able to offer social support), satisfaction with life 
decreased. 
Beyond effects on CVR and satisfaction with life, more conceptually distal 
outcomes were also directly affected by confederate characteristics, in support of a 
religion-as-schema conceptualization. These more distal outcomes included amount of 
money donated to charity and time spent cheating. Contrary to expectation, those 
receiving social support from a politically similar confederate donated most to charity, 
more than those receiving support from a religiously similar confederate or politically or 
religiously dissimilar confederates. Although prosociality charitable giving is often linked 
with religion (and was in Studies 1 and 3), this study failed to find an effect of religion. 
Several explanations are possible. First, although both politicality and religiousness have 
both been associated with giving to charity (Lee & Farrell, 2003 and Lincoln, Morrissey, 
& Mundey, 2008, respectively), an experimental comparison of the effects of politics and 
religion on charitable giving has never before been undertaken. Perhaps political 
affiliation, particularly in the highly partisan United States, is more linked to charitable 
giving than religious affiliation. Second, because the effect of political identification on 
amount donated to charity was only present when the confederate was similar to the 
participant, a general priming effect is unlikely. However, the specificity of the effect, 
that social support from a politically identified confederate only increases donation to 




drive the effect (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). In other words, spending time with a 
fellow partisan may inspire more competition to do a good deed than spending time with 
a fellow religious adherent. Another explanation is that this study was conducted spring 
and summer of 2010 during the run-up to state elections in fall 2010, including a hotly 
contested and highly publicized gubernatorial race. Calls for donations to political parties 
and fundraising connected to the elections were common during data collection for Study 
2. Although the donations in the current study were to a nonpartisan organization 
dedicated to finding solutions to hunger, it is possible that repeated calls for donations 
during the election season forged a stronger link between giving money and partisan 
politics than usual, explaining the link between politically similar social support and 
donation to charity. 
As predicted, participants who received social support from a religiously similar 
confederate cheated less than those who received support from a religiously dissimilar or 
politically similar or dissimilar confederate. Because the effect was again limited to the 
similar condition, social comparison may also be a helpful explanation here. While 
spending time with a fellow partisan seemed to lead to a competition to do good (i.e., 
donate to charity), spending time with a fellow religious adherent lead to a compulsion 
not to do bad (i.e., spend less time cheating; see Rhoades et al., 2007 for a similar 
pattern). 
CVR, satisfaction with life, amount of money donated to charity, and time spent 
cheating were all affected by the religious or political, similar or dissimilar identification 




social support. Characteristics of the supporter matter and social support from a 
religiously identified individual, especially a religiously similar individual, resulted in 
overall better outcomes than support from a nonreligiously identified individual.  
Taking individual differences in religion into account further clarified the effects 
of confederate identification on outcomes. CVR and satisfaction with life (the more 
proximal outcomes) were not moderated by individual differences in religion, but amount 
of money donated to charity, time spent cheating, and sense of coherence (the more distal 
outcomes) all were. As predicted, higher levels of religiousness enhanced the effect of 
religious social support. Those who were high on verticality and who received social 
support from a religiously identified confederate cheated less and gave more to charity 
compared to those who received social support from a politically identified confederate. 
Finally, as in Study 1, those high on verticality in the religion condition experienced a 
decrease in sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session. Again, sense 
of coherence is arguably the most conceptually distal outcome for religious social 
support. The next study examines the role of religion in a meaning system, a 
manipulation that is conceptually proximal for the sense of coherence outcome. 
Limitations. The CVR measures used in this study were incomplete. Heart rate 
and MAP during the neutral film, meant to establish a baseline level of reactivity, were 
not subtracted from heart rate and MAP during speech preparation and speech delivery. 
Because confederate identification took place before applying the physiological sensors 
to preserve the plausibility of the deception, group differences already existed during the 




deception and establishing a physiological baseline before the social support 
manipulation. 
While the diversity of participants‟ religious affiliation is a benefit for 
generalizability of these results, it also posed a limitation for understanding the results. 
The confederate in the religiously similar condition always purported to be the same 
religious affiliation as the participant, whether that was Jewish, Episcopalian, or atheist. It 
would have been interesting to break down the effects of religiously similar social 
support by religious affiliation. For example, does social support from a fellow atheist 
have the same effects as social support from a fellow Episcopalian or a fellow Jew? 
Unfortunately, small cell sizes precluded answering this question. Future studies should 
use purposive sampling to delve further into potential differential effects of religious 







Study 3. Meaning Mechanism 
 I hypothesized that those exposed to a religious humanitarian meaning system 
would donate more to charity and would experience more sense of coherence than those 
exposed to a nonreligious humanitarian meaning system. Further, I predicted effects of 
the religious humanitarian meaning system on more conceptually distal outcomes. 
Namely, that those primed with a religious meaning system would cheat less and have 
greater satisfaction with life than those primed with a nonreligious meaning system. 
Finally, I predicted that individual differences in religion would moderate these effects. 
Method 
 Participants. In exchange for 20 dollars, 70 undergraduates completed an online 
questionnaire and a series of laboratory tasks. Three participants (4.3%) were not native 
English speakers and were not included in further analyses, leaving 67 participants 
(62.7% female; 73.1% white; Age: 18-33, M = 19.5). Participants were religiously 
diverse
7
; 28.4% self-identified as nonreligious. 
 Procedure. Participants evaluated three websites with an eye for characteristics 
such as ease of navigability, organization, and visual appeal, completing scales 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the website design. Two of the websites were 
about neutral topics (i.e., car repair and a music festival); one of the websites contained 
content implicitly priming either religious humanitarianism (N = 22), secular 




= 22). The religious humanitarianism, secular humanitarianism, and control websites 
shared the same color scheme and organizational structure. Both the religious and secular 
humanitarianism websites touted humanitarianism as a meaningful perspective on life, 
but the religious website used religious language throughout the website. See Figure 23. 
Following the evaluation of each website, participants completed a three question quiz 
about the content of each website to ensure attendance to the material. 
 After the website evaluation priming task, participants were given the same 
opportunity to donate money to charity described above as a part of Study 2. Following 
this measure of prosociality, participants completed a questionnaire, including the Sense 
of Coherence scale (Antonovsky, 1987), the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 
1985), and the I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007) followed by the Word Completion Task 
(Raad, 2003) and the same mental rotation cheating measure in previous studies. Finally, 
participants were led through a funnel debriefing interview described above as a part of 
Studies 1 and 2. 
Results  
 Preliminary analyses. An ANOVA was used to determine whether the 
manipulated type of website influenced how participants performed on the content 
quizzes, an indicator of how closely participants paid attention to the websites. No such 
effect was found (p = .62), indicating that effects of condition are not due to differences 
in attention. 
 To test the success of the manipulation, an ANOVA was used to compare the 




were dropped from analysis. An effect of condition on religious word completion was 
found (Figure 24), F(2, 61) = 6.09, p = .004. Tukey post-hoc tests indicated a successful 
manipulation of religion; those in the religious humanitarianism meaning condition 
completed more word stems with religious words (M = 2.09, SE = .24) than those in the 
control condition (M = 1.05, SE = .25), p = .003. Curiously, those in the nonreligious 
humanitarianism meaning condition also completed more word stems with religious 
words (M = 2.09, SE = .24) than those in the control condition, p = .003, suggesting that 
humanitarianism, whether religious or nonreligious, may activate religious schemas. 
 To determine if the effects of type of website were due to emotion processes, 
ANOVAs were conducted on positive and negative emotion states during the lab session 
and on changes in positive and negative emotion states from the prequestionnaire to the 
lab session. None of these were significant (p's = .26 - .92), indicating that effects of 
condition are not due to emotional processes. 
 Although not significant, there was a medium sized relationship between social 
desirability and amount of money donated to charity (see Table 3). To ensure that effects 
described below were not due to social desirability, all analyses controlled for social 
desirability using ANCOVAs and stepwise regressions. Results were not much changed 
by controlling for social desirability; sometimes effects were slightly enhanced, 
sometimes slightly diminished. Therefore, reported statistics do not adjust for this social 
desirability. 
 Main effects. I hypothesized that those exposed to a religious humanitarian 




humanitarian meaning system. One bivariate outlier from the nonreligious condition on 
the prosociality measure ($ donated to charity) was deleted. During funnel debriefing, 
nine participants indicated suspicion of a connection between the website evaluation task 
and the opportunity to donate money to charity; these were deleted from subsequent 
analyses.
8
 An ANOVA revealed a trend of the effect of condition on amount of money 
donated to charity, though not entirely in the direction anticipated (Figure 25), F(2, 52) = 
2.95, p = .061. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three groups revealed a trend 
indicating that those in the control condition (M = 7.35, SE = 1.24) gave more money to 
charity than those exposed to the nonreligious humanitarian meaning system (M = 3.1, SE 
= 1.24; p = .02).
9
 Comparisons between those in the religious humanitarianism condition 
(M = 4.87, SE = 1.43) and the control and nonreligious humanitarianism condition were 
not statistically significant at p < .05. Comparing the religious and the nonreligious 
humanitarian meaning systems alone, a trend indicated that those in the religious 
condition donated more than the nonreligious condition, t(33) = 1.7, p = .099 (Figure 26).  
 I also hypothesized that those exposed to a religious humanitarian meaning 
system would experience more sense of coherence than those exposed to a nonreligious 
humanitarian meaning system. I found no evidence of this effect (p = .73). Further, I 
predicted that those primed with a religious meaning system would cheat less and have 
greater satisfaction with life than those primed with a nonreligious meaning system. 
Neither prediction was supported by ANOVA analyses of the data (p's = .33, .86).  
 Interaction effects. I predicted the individual differences in beliefs would 




satisfaction with life, and time spent cheating. Specifically, I expected that the religion 
meaning system condition would have greater effects on outcomes in the context of 
higher religiousness and greater vertical orientation in religion. Zero-order correlations of 
outcome and moderator variables can be found in Table 9. Relationships of predictors 
with outcome variables were examined with a series of multiple regression analyses with 
condition as a 3-level categorical predictor and general religiousness, God image, and 
verticality as centered continuous moderators. Condition was dummy coded into two 
variables (Condition: religious and Condition: nonreligious) with the control condition as 
the reference group. Interaction terms were computed by multiplying each of the 
continuous moderators by the each of the dummy codes. Five terms were entered into 
each regression testing the interaction of experimental condition and belief variable: the 
two dummy coded variables of the condition (Condition: religious and Condition: 
nonreligious), the continuous moderator, the product of Condition: religion and the 
continuous moderator, and the product of Condition: nonreligious and the continuous 
moderator. Results of all regression analyses can be found in Table 10. 
 The effect of condition on change in sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire 
to the lab session was moderated by religiousness. Adding the interaction terms to the 
model predicting change in sense of coherence resulted in a trend increase in variance 
explained, R
2
Change = .088, F(2, 59) = 2.901, p = .063. A trend Condition: religion x 
religiousness interaction, B = .208, p = .077, showed that, compared to the control 
condition, participants exposed to the religious meaning system experienced a greater 




on religiousness in the religious meaning system condition also experienced a greater 
increase in sense of coherence compared to those in the nonreligious meaning system 
condition, B = .277, p = .022. The interaction of religiousness with the nonreligious 
meaning system compared to the control was not significant (p = .52). See Figure 27. 
The effect of condition on change in sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire 
to the lab session was also moderated by verticality. Adding the interaction terms resulted 
in a marginal increase in variance explained, R
2
Change = .077, F(2, 60) = 2.52, p = .089.  
This was driven by a Condition: religion X verticality interaction, B = 3.27, p = .051. 
That is, compared to the control condition, participants exposed to the religious 
humanitarian meaning system experienced an increase in sense of coherence when they 
were more vertical in their religiousness. In addition, compared to the nonreligious 
meaning system, a trend indicated that participants exposed to the religious humanitarian 
meaning system also experienced an increase in sense of coherence when they were more 
vertical in their religiousness, B = 2.433, p = .08. The interaction of verticality with the 
nonreligious meaning system condition was not significant (p = .64). See Figure 28.  
 Individual differences in religion did not moderate effects of condition on amount 
donated to charity, satisfaction with life, or time spent cheating. 
Discussion 
These results indicate that a religious meaning system is distinct from a 
nonreligious meaning system. Exposure to a religious meaning system resulted in more 
money donated to charity than exposure to a nonreligious meaning system (though less 




sense of coherence; however, both religiousness and verticality moderated the effect of 
meaning system on sense of coherence. The more religious and the more vertically 
oriented an individual, the more exposure to the religious meaning system increased 
sense of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session. This result is the 
opposite of the moderation of the effect of condition on sense of coherence by verticality 
found in Studies 1 and 2. In both cases, those high on verticality in the religious condition 
(God prime in Study 1, religious social support in Study 2) experienced a decrease in 
sense of coherence. One explanation may be that sense of coherence was a conceptually 
distal outcome in Studies 1 and 2 and a conceptually proximal outcome in Study 3. Sense 
of coherence, an outcome indicative of a meaningful live, increased only when religious 
individuals were exposed to a religious meaning system, not a religious supernatural 
agent and not religious social support. The specificity of these results suggests that 
religion is not one-dimensional; different aspects of religion have different outcomes. 
This theme will again be taken up in the general discussion. 
Exposure to the religious meaning system was also predicted to affect more distal 
outcomes, namely to increase satisfaction with life and to decrease time spent cheating; 
no directed or moderated effects were found on these, offering some evidence against 
conceptualizing religion-as-schema, in contrast to the findings of Studies 1 and 2. 
However, the word completion manipulation check may offer some insight into this 
missing finding. Recall that religious and nonreligious humanitarianism had identical 
effects on number of religiously completed words near the end of the lab session (see 




outcomes, which closely followed the manipulation. However, the effects of religious and 
nonreligious humanitarianism on outcomes both conceptually and temporally distal may 
have decayed over the course of the lab session, until differences between the two were 
nonexistent. Future research can test this possibility by measuring conceptually distal 








Religion is not “just” supernatural agency, social support, or meaning; religious 
versions of these mechanisms are distinct from nonreligious versions. Exposure to a 
religious supernatural agent reduces cheating more than exposure to a nonreligious 
supernatural agent (Study 1), receiving religious social support during a stressful task 
reduces CVR more than receiving nonreligious social support (Study 2), and exposure to 
a religious meaning system increases charitable donations more than exposure to a 
nonreligious meaning system (Study 3). The independent predictive power of religion 
beyond more general mechanisms demonstrates that religion cannot be reduced to so-
called “mundane mediators” (Joiner et al., 2002, p. 214). Therefore, the psychological 
study of religion has the potential to make unique contributions to our understanding of 
human cognition, behavior, and health. Future research should be dedicated to fully 
understanding these contributions. 
The primary concern of this work was whether religious mechanisms differ from 
nonreligious mechanisms. Future work should address the deeper psychological questions 
of how religious mechanisms differ. Several potential accounts of the differences between 
religious and nonreligious mechanisms were proposed. Qualities of God as 
anthropomorphic, transcendent, and moral distinguish God from ghost. The ability of 
religious social support to potentially recall support from God and support from those 




nonreligious social support. The transcendent nature of religious meaning distinguishes 
religious meaning from nonreligious meaning. However, none of these possibilities were 
directly tested in the present studies. If these accounts of the unique effects of religion on 
outcomes were measured or manipulated, a greater understanding of the causal effects of 
religion could be gained. Further, to determine that religion per se is responsible for 
differences between religious and nonreligious versions of mechanisms found in these 
studies, the question must be answered whether adding religion to the general 
mechanisms has more of an effect, or a different effect, than adding anything else in 
particular to the general mechanisms. Is the observed effect because participants were 
presented with [particular type] mechanism vs. general mechanism, or because it was a 
religious mechanism vs. general mechanism? Unpacking the reasons why the religious 
versions of mechanisms had different outcomes than the nonreligious versions will help 
address this concern. 
One account of the unique effects of religion tested here was a religion-as-schema 
conceptualization. Current results were highly suggestive of this account. As discussed in 
the introduction, those who have similar experiences are likely to have similar schemata 
through cultural transmission. In the United States, religion is a very common experience, 
shared by everyone in the culture, including those without personal religious beliefs. 
Therefore, the most central aspects of religion, those that are most persistently 
encountered in the culture (e.g., God is watching you, religion is a source of support, 
religion is a source of meaning) should be the most efficacious and the responses most 




stressed when receiving social support, find a sense of coherence in a meaning system) 
should be the most affected, regardless of individual differences in religion. With the 
exception of change in sense of coherence in Study 3, all conceptually proximal 
outcomes (Study 1: time spent cheating; Study 2: CVR to stress and change in 
satisfaction with life; Study 3: amount donated to charity) were directly affected by the 
religion condition. Also with the exception of change in sense of coherence in Study 3, 
all conceptually proximal outcomes were not moderated by individual differences in 
religion, despite about a third of participants identifying as nonreligious in all three 
studies. That is, for outcomes that are closely tied with the manipulated aspect of religion 
(i.e., a religious supernatural agent and cheating behavior; religious social support and 
responses to stress; religious humanitarianism and charitable giving) it did not matter 
how religious participants were or how they were religious. The religion manipulation, 
for conceptually proximal outcomes, had the predicted effect regardless of individual 
differences in religious belief. 
On the other hand, responses more conceptually distal to the ideas about religion 
in the culture (e.g., donating more money to charity after receiving religious social 
support) should not necessarily be a part of a general cultural level of the religious 
schema. Rather, a specific religious schema, solidified by personally held religious 
beliefs and intentional experiences, should result in effects of a religion manipulation on 
both conceptually proximal and distal responses. This was so. While there was no 
moderation of the effect of the religion condition on conceptually proximal outcomes, 




religion condition on more conceptually distal outcomes (Study 1: number of prosocial 
flyers taken, change in satisfaction with life, and change in sense of coherence; Study 2: 
time spent cheating, donation to charity, and change in sense of coherence), either by 
enhancing an existing main effect or by revealing an otherwise invisible effect. 
Furthermore, offering additional evidence for the specific level of the religious schema, 
effects of the religion manipulations on conceptually distal outcomes seemed constrained 
to specific situations, such as a match between the type of belief and the manipulation (as 
in Study 1) or a match between the type of outcome and the manipulation (as in Study 3). 
The specific level of the religious schema apparently requires some congruence of 
individual difference, manipulation condition, and outcome while the general level does 
not. 
Conceptualizing religion as a cognitive schema with both general and specific 
levels has far-reaching implications for the psychology of religion. As McIntosh (1995) 
notes, a religion-as-schema conceptualization has the potential to combine previous work 
in the psychology of religion into a unified framework. One specific benefit of religion-
as-schema is that it has the ability to explain a particular perplexity in current priming 
research. Sometimes individual differences in religion moderate priming effects (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, Study 2; Weisbuch-Remmington 
et al., 2005) and sometimes they do not (e.g., Newton & McIntosh, 2009; Pichon et al., 
2007; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007; Ritter & Preston, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 
2007, Study 1). In line with religion-as-schema, when individual differences in religion 




because the religion prime was linked to the measured outcome at the level of a general 
religion schema, one that everyone in the sample possessed regardless of personal 
religious beliefs. When individual differences in religion did moderate the religion prime, 
it is theoretically because the religion prime was linked to the measured outcome at the 
level of a specific religious schema, one that only those with particular religious beliefs 
possessed.  
One goal of future research in the area of religious schema should be to identify 
which outcomes are linked to a general religious schema and which are linked to specific 
religious schemas. These links likely differ by culture. For example, the general religious 
schemas in highly religious countries (e.g., Egypt, Indonesia, Sierra Leone) are likely to 
be robust, while highly irreligious countries (e.g., Sweden, Vietnam, Denmark) are likely 
to have scant general religious schemas. The content of those religious schemas are also 
likely to differ by culture. For example, largely Islamic cultures would form different 
general religious schemas than largely Christian cultures. At the individual level, 
different specific religious schema should be as manifold as the specific religious beliefs 
they comprise; there is much work to be done to understand the effects of religion on 
cognitive, behavioral, and health outcomes. 
Another conclusion of these studies concerns the multidimensionality of religion. 
As described in the introduction, the call for increasing specification of religious 
variables (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009) has been answered with success in correlational 
studies. Distinctions in degree of religiousness, types of religious affiliation, and 




of religion in cognition and behavior. However, the trend has largely not extended to 
experimental manipulations. Particularly, priming studies of religion have primed 
religion in general rather than specific aspects of religion. While this approach has 
demonstrated that religion is not just associated with outcomes, but has causal effects, 
exactly which aspects of religion are behind those effects are usually unknown. The 
current studies have shown that while specific manipulations of religion (i.e., 
supernatural agent priming, provision of religious social support, and exposure to a 
religious meaning system) have some common effects (e.g., time spent cheated decrease 
in the religion condition in both Study 1 and Study 2), specific manipulations of religion 
also have differential effects on outcomes (e.g., sense of coherence decreased for those 
high in verticality in Studies 1 and 2, but increased in Study 3). Care should be taken in 
future studies to design manipulations of religion which will allow shared and unshared 
effects to be parsed. Further, in addition to addressing the multidimensionality of religion 
with specific manipulations, future studies should continue to measure individual 
differences in religion to test them for moderation of these manipulations. It is a complex 
approach, but then, religion is a complex topic of study. 
Conclusion 
The findings of the three studies described here demonstrate that religious 
versions of mechanisms are capable of explaining independent variance in outcomes and 
are therefore unique. Religion is not “just” supernatural agency, social support, or 
meaning. One important implication of these results is that religion cannot be fully 




dedicated to the study of religion in its own right. Hopefully, these efforts will result in a 
fuller understanding of this important aspect of human experience and the psychological, 
social, and health outcomes it affects. Because religion is multidimensional and fuzzy, 
understanding religion is not an easy task. However, the present studies, by 
demonstrating that religion has unique effects on outcomes and by suggesting 






1. Study 1 participants were 43.8% Christian, 18.8% None, 13.8% Jewish, 8.8% Atheist, 
7.5% Agnostic, 2.6% Buddhist, 1.3% Muslim, 1.3% Deist, and 1.3% No answer given. 
 
2. Study 2 participants were 52.2% Christian, 13% Atheist, 11.6% Agnostic, 5.8% Jewish, 
5.8% None, 2.8% Buddhist, 1.3% Muslim, and 7.2% Other (spiritualism, deism, and 
holism). 
 
3. Although it is common to compute change scores for psychological variables during 
speech preparation and speech delivery by subtracting the respective values from 
baseline, controlling for baseline is not necessary for this study because all 
hypotheses hinge upon comparisons of randomly assigned condition s. Further, 
because the baseline necessarily followed the experimental manipulation, differences 
in condition were already present at baseline, making change scores even less 
meaningful. 
 
4. Mean arterial pressure (MAP) is often preferred as a measure of blood pressure to 
diastolic or systolic pressure alone because it reflects the average pressure during the 
entire cardiac cycle (Andreassi, 2006). 
 
5. All participants‟ contributions were donated to Action Against Hunger (see 
actionagainsthunger.org). The description of the charity read: 
 
Action Against Hunger is an international relief and development organization 
committed to saving the lives of malnourished children and families while 
seeking long-term, sustainable solutions to hunger. Recognized as a world 
leader in the fight against hunger and malnutrition, Action Against Hunger 
specializes in responding to emergency situations of war, conflict, and natural 
disaster. Their innovative programs in nutrition, water and sanitation, food 
security, health care, and advocacy reach more than 5 million people in over 40 
countries, helping vulnerable populations regain their self-sufficiency. 
 
6. Here and following, when degrees of freedom contain decimal points, Levene's test 
was significant, so equal variances were not assumed. 
 
7. Study 3 participants were 62.7% Christian, 11.9% Agnostic, 9% Atheist, 7.5% None, 
4.5% Jewish, 3% Universalist, and 1.5% No answer given. 
 
8. The high degree of suspicion is likely due to the relative transparency of the 
relationship between the manipulation (evaluating humanitarianism websites) and the 
outcome measure (donating money to charity). In support of this interpretation, only 
participants in the religious (N = 7) and nonreligious humanitarianism conditions (N 




deleted from analysis is cause for concern. However, analyses comparing the 
religious and nonreligious conditions with and without the suspicious participants 
yielded the same direction of effect, albeit nonsignificant with the suspicious 
participants included, t(42) = 1.1, p = .279. 
 
9. Either the control condition in this study, the manufacturing website, increased the 
amount of money participants donated to charity or the religious and nonreligious 
humanitarianism meaning system websites decreased the amount of money 
participants donated to charity. In fact, those in the control condition gave an average 
of $3.26 more to charity than those in the religious and nonreligious humanitarian 
meaning system conditions. Although it is difficult to know with certainty whether 
the control increased donations or the humanitarianism websites decreased donations, 
one explanation for the former is that because the manufacturing website mentioned a 
contributing a large amount of money in the first paragraph (“Manufacturing… 
contributes more than $1.6 trillion to the U.S. economy annually.”), the control 
website inadvertently primed giving away money instead of providing a neutral 
comparison condition. One research study has shown that priming money decreases 
rather than increases amount of money donated (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). 
However, a key difference exists between that study and Study 3; in Vohs and 
colleagues (2006), money was primed generally without regard to the amount or what 
was done with the money whereas the control condition in Study 3 mentioned a large 
amount of money being contributed to the U.S. economy. This difference could have 
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Zero-order correlations of prequestionnaire measures. 
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belief 
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Means, standard deviations, and N's for the prequestionnaire, lab session, and change scores of 
sense of coherence and satisfaction with life from Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
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Study 1 Sense of 
coherence 





79 5.26 (.28) 80 .28 (.72) 79 
Study 2 Sense of 
coherence 







68 .31 (.74) 68 
Study 3 Sense of 
coherence 













Zero-order correlations of social desirability and outcome variables from Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
 
 
Note. df's = 35-79; HR = heart rate, MAP = mean arterial blood pressure; †p < .10; ** p < .01 
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Note. df's = 74-79; Verticality is base-10 log transformed; †p < .10; * p < .05
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Hierarchical regressions testing verticality and religiousness as moderators of the effects 
of priming condition on outcome variables from Study 1.  
 
 
Note. N = 80; SOC = sense of coherence, SWLS = satisfaction with life scale; B‟s are 
unstandardized regression weights at the final step of the equation; Verticality is base-10 
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Hierarchical regressions testing paranormal belief as a moderator of the effects of 
priming condition on outcome variables from Study 1. 
 
 
Note. N = 80; SOC = sense of coherence, SWLS = satisfaction with life scale; B‟s are 
unstandardized regression weights at the final step of the equation; Verticality is base-10 
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Note. df's = 36-68; HR = heart rate, MAP = mean arterial blood pressure; Verticality is base-10 log transformed; †p < .10; * p 
< .05; ** p < .01 









































































$ donated to 
charity 
- -.11 .09 -.22† -.00 -.19 
Change 
satisfaction 
with life  
 - .27* -.06 -.03 -.12 
Change sense 
of coherence 
  - .07 .01 -.27* 
Time spent 
cheating 










Hierarchical regressions testing verticality and religiousness as moderators of the effects of 
social support from a religiously identified versus a politically identified confederate on outcome 




Note. N = 69; HR = heart rate, MAP = mean arterial blood pressure, SOC = sense of coherence, 
SWLS = satisfaction with life scale; B‟s are unstandardized regression weights at the final step 
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Zero-order correlations of outcome variables and predicted moderators from Study 3. 
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Hierarchical regressions testing verticality and religiousness as moderators of the effects of 
website condition on outcome variables from Study 3. 
 
 
Note. N = 67; SOC = sense of coherence, SWLS = satisfaction with life scale; B‟s are 
unstandardized regression weights at the final step of the equation; Verticality is base-10 log 
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Figure 1. The sequence and timing of events in the lexical decision task priming 
supernatural agency in Study 1. 
Figure 2. Sample problem from the mental rotation task. Items were rotated along both 
the x and y axes and options appear very similar, presenting a very difficult choice and 
encouraging cheating in the face of difficulty. 
Figure 3. The effect of priming on the religious word completion task in Study 1. Error 
bars represent the standard error.  
Figure 4. The effects of priming on time spent cheating on the mental rotation task in 
Study 1. Error bars represent the standard error.  
Figure 5. The moderation of the effects of supernatural priming on time spent cheating by 
individual differences in paranormal beliefs in Study 1. 
Figure 6. The moderation of the effects of supernatural priming on the number of 
prosocial flyers taken by individual differences in verticality in Study 1. 
Figure 7. The moderation of the effects of supernatural priming on the number of 
prosocial flyers taken by individual differences in paranormal beliefs in Study 1. 
Figure 8. The moderation of the effects of supernatural priming on the change in 
satisfaction with life from the prequestionnaire to the lab session by individual 




Figure 9. The moderation of the effects of supernatural priming on the change in 
satisfaction with life from the prequestionnaire to the lab session by individual 
differences in religiousness in Study 1. 
Figure 10. The moderation of the effects of supernatural priming on the change in sense 
of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session by individual differences in 
verticality in Study 1. 
Figure 11. The effects of experimental stage on heart rate in Study 2 controlling for 
somatic movement. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 12. The effects of experimental stage on blood pressure in Study 2. Error bars 
represent the standard error.  
Figure 13. The effects of confederate type on heart rate during speech preparation in 
Study 2 controlling for somatic movement. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 14. The effects of confederate type on blood pressure during speech preparation in 
Study 2. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 15. The effects of confederate type on heart rate during speech delivery in Study 2 
controlling for somatic movement. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 16. The effects of confederate type on blood pressure during speech delivery in 
Study 2. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 17. The effects of confederate type on change in satisfaction with life from the 
prequestionnaire to the lab session in Study 2. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 18. The effects of confederate type on amount donated to charity in Study 2. Error 




Figure 19. The effects of confederate type on time spent cheating in Study 2. Error bars 
represent the standard error. 
Figure 20. The moderation of the effects of type of social support on the amount of time 
spent cheating by individual differences in verticality in Study 2. 
Figure 21. The moderation of the effects of type of social support on the amount of 
money donated to charity by individual differences in verticality in Study 2. 
Figure 22. The moderation of the effects of type of social support on change in sense of 
coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session by individual differences in 
verticality in Study 2. 
Figure 23. Screenshots of the websites used in Study 3 to prime (a) religious 
humanitarianism or (b) nonreligious humanitarianism and the control website on 
manufacturing (c). 
Figure 24. The effect of priming on the religious word completion task in Study 3. Error 
bars represent the standard error.  
Figure 25. The effects of website type, including the control condition, on amount 
donated to charity in Study 3. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 26. The effects of the religious and nonreligious humanitarian websites on amount 
donated to charity in Study 3. Error bars represent the standard error. 
Figure 27. The moderation of the effects of website condition on change in sense of 
coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session by individual differences in 




Figure 28. The moderation of the effects of type of website condition on change in sense 
of coherence from the prequestionnaire to the lab session by individual differences in 
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Figure 16 
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Figure 17 
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Figure 18 
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Figure 19 
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Figure 26 
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